Freedom of Movement for Workers from Central and Eastern Europe: Experiences in Ireland and Sweden by Gerard Hughes & Nicola Doyle
2006:5
Nicola Doyle, Gerard Hughes
and Eskil Wadensjö
Freedom of Movement
for Workers from Central
and Eastern Europe  
Experiences in Ireland
and Sweden
Nicola Doyle, Gerard Hughes
and Eskil Wadensjö
Freedom of Movement
for Workers from Central
and Eastern Europe 
Experiences in Ireland
and Sweden
– SIEPS 2006:5 – 
Report No. 5
May/2006
Publisher: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies
The report is available at
www.sieps.se
The report can also be ordered from
info@sieps.se 
The opinions expressed in this report are
those of the authors and are not necessarily
shared by SIEPS.
Cover: Svensk Information AB
Print: EO-print AB
Stockholm, May 2006
ISSN 1651-8942
ISBN 91-85129-38-0
FOREWORD
In 2004 the European Union (EU) gained ten new Member States. However
in many of the old Member States there were increasing concerns about the
implications of this particular enlargement. Not only did it represent a large
increase in the Union’s population; in eight of the ten countries the wage
levels were substantially below the wage levels in the old Member States.
As several governments feared mass immigration, “welfare tourism” and
negative effects on their labour markets, transitional rules were included in
the Accession Treaty with regard to the freedom of movement for workers
from the Central and East European Member States.
As two years have passed since the 2004 EU enlargement, the Swedish
Institute for European Policy Studies, SIEPS, finds it important to examine
the effects in the countries that opened their labour market to workers from
the CEE Member States. This study attempts to provide as thorough as pos-
sible a picture of the post-enlargement experiences in Ireland and Sweden.
SIEPS conducts and promotes research and analysis of European policy is-
sues within the disciplines of political science, law and economics. SIEPS
strives to act as a link between the academic world and policy-makers at
various levels. By issuing this report, SIEPS hopes to make a contribution to
the debate on transitional rules and the role of migration in the European
Union.
Stockholm, May 2006
Annika Ström Melin
Director
SIEPS
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ABBREVIATIONS AND IRISH AND
SWEDISH LANGUAGE TERMS
EU8 The Central and Eastern European Accession States
(the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia)
EU10 EU8 + Cyprus and Malta
CTA Common Travel Area
Dáil Eireann Parliament of Ireland
ECJ European Court of Justice
IBEC Irish Business and Employers Confederation
ICP Immigration Control Platform
ICTU Irish Congress of Trade Unions
LO Swedish Trade Union Confederation
Riksdag Parliament of Sweden
SACO Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations
SIPTU Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union
SVT Swedish National Television
Taoiseach Prime Minister
TCO Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees
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8EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the run-up to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) there
were increasing concerns in the old Member States about its effects on
labour markets and future immigration flows. The magnitude of the in-
crease in the EU population coupled with higher unemployment and lower
incomes in the Accession States (EU10) – especially in the Central and
Eastern European (CEE) Member States – fuelled fears of mass immigra-
tion and “welfare tourism”. In the end only Ireland, Sweden and the United
Kingdom opened up their labour markets to workers from the ten new
Member States. This study attempts to give as thorough as possible a
picture of the post-enlargement experiences in two of the three countries;
Ireland and Sweden.1
The pre-enlargement debates
Even though Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom opened their labour
markets to workers from the Accession States, restrictions of some kind
were seen as a necessary precaution by important political actors in all
three countries. The first movements came in Sweden in November 2003,
when Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson suddenly voiced fears of
“welfare tourism” becoming a problem after the enlargement. In the course
of events there were also assertions that the Swedish labour market would
be negatively affected by wage competition and that immigration would be
higher as a consequence of restrictions being imposed in all or the major-
ity of the remaining EU15 Member States. At the same time, several pro-
ponents of open borders pointed out that a reversal of Sweden’s position on
transitional rules would be a breach of faith vis-à-vis the new members. It
was also argued that the “welfare tourism” hypothesis lacked credibility as
migrant workers tend to be young, well educated and single and that this in
turn implied that the economic gains from immigration were likely to out-
weigh any economic losses.
The Swedish Government’s announcement that it would propose transition-
al arrangements had important implications for Ireland and Britain. The
British Labour Government came under pressure from the Conservative
party and the British tabloid press and introduced measures that effectively
closed off any possibilities for Accession State nationals to access out-of-
work benefits unless they had been working continuously in the UK for
more than one year. A Worker Registration Scheme (WRS), which places
1 The impact of the Eastern enlargement on the UK has been extensively analysed in a paper
by Gilpin et al. (2005).
an obligation on Accession State nationals gaining employment as an em-
ployee to register details with the Home Office, was also introduced. The
WRS would allow the British Government to closely monitor the labour
market and therefore act quickly should any disturbances occur.
The Irish labour market was in a very strong position at the time of en-
largement. Low unemployment coupled with strong employment growth
meant that Irish employers were sourcing more of their labour from
abroad. In the year prior to accession 45,700 work permits were issued in
Ireland. It was expected prior to the EU enlargement that the Accession
States together with the old Member States would provide the bulk of im-
migrants required to meet the employment needs for maintaining economic
growth. The EU enlargement debate was therefore much more focused
around protecting the welfare system, in particular after the UK decided to
close off welfare benefits to Accession State nationals for a two year
period. By the end of February 2004 the Irish Government introduced the
Habitual Residence Condition (HRC) which meant that foreign nationals
would have to live in the Common Travel Area (CTA), comprising Ireland,
the UK, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, for at least two years, or
meet certain other requirements, before being entitled to social assistance
or child benefit.
The enlargement debates across Europe resulted in four different regimes
being in place in the EU15 Member States. The first regime (Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Spain) gives citizens
from the Accession States no more rights than non-EEA nationals. The
second regime (Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal)
adopts essentially the same rule as the first but opens the labour market to
a quota of the Accession State nationals. The third regime (Ireland and the
UK) allows unrestricted access to labour markets but restrict access to
social benefits. In the fourth regime (Sweden) European Community rules
apply.
Immigration and economic effects
The large differences in income and the high unemployment rates in the
Accession States, along with free movement of workers, imply that immi-
gration will flow from new to old Member States. However, income dis-
parities are not sufficient to induce migration. The level of unemployment
and the number of job vacancies in the host country are important pull
factors and the relative labour market situation is also important in deter-
mining whether migrant workers from the Accession States choose to go to
Ireland, Sweden or the UK. Other factors influencing a migrant’s choice of
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destination are geographic proximity and language. Studies have shown
that countries with English as the main language are preferred by migrants
with high levels of education.
The net effects on the public sector from immigration depend on the size
of the migration flow, the composition of the new immigrants and the
functioning of the economy. The term “welfare magnets” suggests that im-
migrants are to an extent moving because the country of destination has a
highly developed welfare state with generous compensation for those who
are out of work. Empirical studies have not been able to show conclusively
that “welfare tourism” is an important pull factor.
In general, immigration increases labour supply, which in turn implies a
decline in wages. However, an increased supply of labour may also induce
new investments which may counteract a wage decline. Furthermore,
labour is not a homogeneous factor of production: the immigrant work
force may be a complement to, rather than a substitute for, the native work
force. This would imply an increase in the wages of native workers. Hence
it is not possible to determine the sign and size of the wage effect without
empirical studies. Most such studies indicate only small effects.
There have also been fears of displacement effects, i.e. that immigrants
displace native workers. This is based on the mistaken belief that the num-
ber of jobs in the economy is fixed. The unemployment rate is mainly de-
termined by macroeconomic developments and by economic policy. Avail-
able empirical studies indicate that the effects of immigration on unem-
ployment are small.
The case of Sweden
Labour migration dominated immigration to Sweden in the post-war period
up to the early 1970s. The direction of migration has mainly been from
countries with lower income and wage levels than Sweden. Variations over
time have been large and very sensitive to the labour market situation in the
country of origin and especially in Sweden. Following the recession in the
early 1970s labour migration practically stopped from outside the common
Nordic labour market. The migration from the Accession States will most
likely be dominated by labour migration and we can therefore expect large
variation in size depending on the Swedish labour market situation.
Immigration from the Accession States to Sweden increased substantially
in relative terms in 2004 and 2005. Immigration from the EU10 countries
is however still only a small part of the total immigration to Sweden. In
the year before enlargement 2,381 people immigrated to Sweden from the
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Accession States, while the corresponding numbers in 2004 and 2005 were
4,232 and 5,559, respectively. Emigration to the Accession States has also
increased but to a much smaller extent than immigration. Immigration of
men has increased more than immigration of women in the years following
accession. More than half of the immigrants come from Poland and a large
share of the immigrants come from the three Baltic states, especially
Lithuania and Estonia.
There are at least three possible explanations for why immigration to
Sweden has been so small. First, there have been few job vacancies avail-
able for newly arrived immigrants, as job growth has been low. Second,
only a few had the Nordic countries as the preferred destination according
to pre-enlargement surveys. Third, those migrating have chosen Ireland
and the UK instead of Sweden due to easier access to their labour markets
and not least because English is the vernacular language of those two
countries. 
The number of residence permits according to the EEA agreement for citi-
zens from the ten Accession States, which are necessary for those who
wish to stay more than three months in the country, increased both in 2004
and 2005. The increase is large for the categories employers and con-
sultants, but the number of residence permits granted to students and to
relatives of people living in Sweden has also increased. In total, the num-
ber of residence permits issued to Accession State nationals in 2003, in-
cluding prolongations, was 6,317 and the corresponding numbers in 2004
and 2005 were 8,487 and 9,012, respectively.
Labour market statistics for Sweden have a production lag which makes it
impossible to say anything about the situation of the new immigrants in
2005 and 2006. The employment rate for immigrants from the Accession
States living in Sweden in 2003 and 2004 is lower than for people born in
Sweden. Among employed immigrants from the Accession States working
hours are shorter and monthly wages for full-time work are lower com-
pared to those of people born in Sweden, but the differences are relatively
small. The educational level is by contrast on average higher among those
coming from the Accession States than for those born in Sweden. Finally,
the distributions according to industry are somewhat different for the na-
tive and the Accession State groups. Those coming from the Accession
States are overrepresented in the health care sector, a sector characterized
by a high demand for labour. Those born in Sweden are instead overrepre-
sented in construction and public administration.
Econometric estimates indicate a negative wage premium of about ten per
cent for Accession State workers, with a slightly less negative value for
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immigrant women than for immigrant men. The earlier the immigrants
have arrived, the smaller is the wage disadvantage. For those who have ar-
rived before 1970 the difference is less than 3 per cent and for those who
have arrived in the period 2000-04 the difference is 20 per cent.
With regard to the fears of “welfare tourism”, voiced prior to enlargement,
there have been no discernible effects. The number of applications for so-
cial assistance in 2004 granted to people who are citizens in one of the ten
Accession States or who were born in one of those states was more or less
the same as in 2003. Moreover, only 1 per cent (€0.01 million) of total
payments of support to family members living in another country was paid
to family members living in one of ten Accession States in 2004.
The case of Ireland
As in Sweden, migratory flows to and from Ireland are very sensitive to
economic conditions, both in Ireland and in the country of origin/destina-
tion. In the period from 1995 to 2000 the Irish economy experienced a
major reversal in fortune, which at the same time led to a reversal in the
migratory trend experienced in the 1980s. Ireland began to experience pos-
itive net migration and in April 2005 the foreign born population reached
6.3 per cent of the total population, compared with 3.2 per cent in April
1996. Even though the boom period of the Irish economy peaked around
the turn of the century, at the time of accession the Irish economy was still
in a strong position: GDP growth was the highest in Europe, at 4.5 per
cent, and unemployment, at 4.4 per cent, was the lowest. 
In contrast to Sweden, immigration from the Accession States to Ireland
was much higher than expected, mainly because of continuing strong
labour demand and possibly because of re-direction of migration. In the
fourth quarter of 2005 it is estimated that some 73,000 EU10 nationals
aged 15 and over were living in Ireland. The labour force participation rate
for Accession State nationals is 90 per cent, compared with 62 per cent for
Irish nationals. EU10 nationals have accounted for approximately half of
the jobs created in Ireland since accession The number of EU10 citizens in
employment more than trebled between the third quarter in 2004 (19,500)
and the fourth quarter in 2005 (61,600). The majority of EU10 workers are
in the construction and manufacturing sectors which employ more than
half of the Accession State workforce in Ireland. The hotels and restaurants
sector has the highest share of EU10 workers, 7.4 per cent.
Personal Public Service Numbers (PPSNs) – which are individual identi-
fiers required to take up a job or access state benefits in Ireland – provide
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detailed information on short-term immigration. The number of PPSNs is-
sued to EU10 nationals has increased dramatically since the turn of the
millennium in general and since accession in particular. In 2004 the num-
ber of PPSNs issued was 59,000 (close to 54,000 post accession) and in
2005 the number almost doubled to 112,000. Between May 2004 and Feb-
ruary 2006, 186,000 PPSNs were allocated to nationals of the Accession
States, out of which more than half went to Polish citizens. At the same
time less than 1,000 Accession State nationals were signing on the unem-
ployment register in March 2006, contradicting the “welfare tourism” argu-
ment. The unemployment rate of EU10 nationals was 2.4 per cent com-
pared with 4.4 per cent for Irish nationals.
Even though it is not possible to distinguish between Irish and EU10 work-
ers with regard to hourly earnings, it is interesting to note that earnings
growth rates decreased after accession in eight of the ten sectors for which
data is available. As noted above, this corresponds well with economic
theory. However, the drop in the earnings growth rates is within historical
experience and it may also be explained by seasonal and other factors be-
sides immigration.
There has been concern about displacement of native workers in some
firms by foreign workers who are being paid less than the collectively
agreed rates of pay. That having been said, if there is displacement it has
not reduced the percentage of firms reporting vacancies or increased the
unemployment rate. In May 2004 10.6 per cent of firms in all sectors re-
ported vacancies, in May 2005 the number was the same and by February
2006 it had risen to 16.7 per cent. Similarly there is no evidence from the
unemployment data that displacement of Irish workers has resulted in an
increase in the unemployment rate. In sum, evidence of a significant re-
duction in the number of jobs available for Irish workers is lacking. How-
ever, the problem has the potential to become a bigger issue unless it is
dealt with, for example by measures such as providing information on
workers rights, extending collective agreements and strengthening the
labour inspectorate.
Conclusion
The enlargement of the European Union on the 1st of May 2004 did lead
to increased migration from the Accession States to Ireland and Sweden.
Two years is a short timeframe for assessing the impact of the EU enlarge-
ment on the Swedish and Irish labour markets. Due to data lags the statisti-
cal timeframe is even shorter. Although the full impact of migration cannot
be expected to have taken place within two years, we believe that the infor-
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mation provided in this report may contribute to the knowledge of likely
effects of the deregulation of migration from the Accession States. To date
the enlargement of the EU has not resulted in any disturbances in the
Swedish or Irish labour markets. There has been no evidence of welfare
tourism or displacement of native workers. 
The migratory flows to Sweden were lower than had been anticipated. In
2005 approximately 5,600 migrants came to Sweden from the Accession
States. The majority of the migrants were female and came from Poland
and the Baltic States. The relatively low flows into Sweden reflected the
fact that citizens of the Accession States were not engaging in welfare
tourism. Of those who did migrate to Sweden there is no evidence that
they are over-represented in the welfare state schemes. The employment
rate for immigrants from the Accession States living in Sweden in 2003
and 2004 is lower than for people born in Sweden.
Employed immigrants from the Accession States work shorter hours, re-
ceive lower monthly wages and have, on average, a higher level of educa-
tion that Swedish born workers. 
Ireland experienced much larger migratory flows than was anticipated
prior to enlargement. In the lead up to the enlargement and during the post
enlargement period the Irish labour market was in a very strong position in
Europe. Employment growth in the year prior to enlargement was 2.8 per
cent and the unemployment rate, at 4.4 per cent, was the lowest in Europe.
The unemployment rate in Ireland has remained low throughout the post-
enlargement period, at around 4.4 per cent. Ireland, therefore, has been an
attractive country of destination for labour migrants. The PPSN figures
estimate flows of 186,000 Accession State nationals aged over 15 into
Ireland in the post-accession period up to February 2006. Labour statistics
estimated the stock of Accession State nationals aged 15 and over at
72,700 in the fourth quarter of 2005. The participation rate of Accession
State nationals in the fourth quarter of 2005 was 90 per cent. This com-
pares with 62 per cent for the labour force as a whole. Through the Habit-
ual Residency Condition the Irish welfare state is largely protected from
welfare tourism and the unemployment register shows that only 1,000
Accession State nationals were signing on in March 2006. Although there
have been some cases of Irish workers being replaced by migrant workers
receiving lower than collectively agreed rates of pay, there is no evidence
that the large inflow of labour migrants into Ireland in the post-accession
period is a source of disturbance in the Irish labour market.
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1 INTRODUCTION
On the 1st of May 2004 eight Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEE), Cyprus and Malta1 joined the European Union. Never in EU histo-
ry had so many countries or persons entered the EU at the same time, as
Table 1.1 shows. The relative increase in the EU population post-enlarge-
ment was smaller than that experienced when Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom (UK) joined in 1973 and it represented an increase of
only 2.8 percentage points more than when the 1986 enlargement, encom-
passing Spain and Portugal, occurred. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the
increase in the EU population coupled with higher unemployment and
lower incomes in the CEE Member States fuelled fears in the EU15 Mem-
ber States of large inflows of migrants from the EU10 Member States.
1 The ten Accession States (EU10) are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. Nationals from the eight CEE Member States
are interchangeably referred to as EU10 or Accession State nationals.
Table 1.1 Population of Accession Countries Relative to EU 
Population
Population
Year Acceding Countries
Number of
countries in the EU 
Absolute 
(1000s)
Relative
(% of EU)
1973 Denmark, Ireland and the UK 9 64 227.8 30.8
1981 Greece 10 9 700.8 3.5
1986 Spain and Portugal 12 48 498.9 16.7
1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden 15 29 339.3 8.4
2004
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
25 74 100.0 19.5
Source: Kvist (2004)
These fears resulted in debates that were conditioned by the different eco-
nomic circumstances obtaining in each member state and with a watchful
eye on how the debate on enlargement was developing in neighbouring
Member States. The extra-national dimension of the debates on enlarge-
ment had a domino effect in which Member States who initially said they
were committed to free movement of labour changed their positions as the
enlargement date of 1 May 2004 approached. 
The next section of the paper gives an overview of the pre-enlargement de-
bates in the EU15 Member States paying particular attention to Ireland,
Sweden and the UK as they were the three countries which allowed free
movement of labour following enlargement, although Ireland and the UK
introduced special conditions restricting access of migrants to welfare
benefits. In section three we will discuss the type of economic effects an
expansion of immigration may lead to. In the fourth section we will focus
on the dimension and composition of the actual migration to Sweden in
the first two years after enlargement. Consideration will be given to the
labour market situation of the immigrants from the Accession States and to
what extent social (benefit) tourism has emerged. The fifth section of the
paper will document changes in migration flows from the Accession States
to Ireland before and after enlargement. Particular attention will be paid to
the labour market position of the migrants in the period up to the end of
2005. A distinction will be made between stocks and flows of migrants
from the Accession States and the composition of migrants from these
states by nationality will be analysed. The last section will summarise the
results for Ireland and Sweden and draw some conclusions about the
magnitude of the migration in the light of what could have been expected
if all of the EU15 Member States had allowed free movement of labour
and what actually happened. As the impact of the Eastern enlargement on
the UK has been extensively analysed in a paper by Gilpin et al. (2005) we
did not feel it necessary to repeat their results.
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2 THE PRE-ENLARGEMENT DEBATES
2.1 Overview of the Debates in EU15 Member States
A number of studies were commissioned to consider the likely migratory
flows that would result from the EU10 enlargement. These studies have
been summarised in various reports by the European Commission (2000,
2003). The earlier Commission study predicted migration flows of 333,000
per year to the EU15 initially, declining to 150,000 per year in a decade.
The later study revised the earlier estimates downward. It predicted net im-
migration of 325,000 per year in the first five years following accession,
declining to 60,000 in a decade. In a report for the Economic Policy Panel
meeting in Luxembourg in April 2005 Boeri and Brücker (2005) estimated
that in the year after enlargement net migration from the Central and East-
ern European Accession States would also amount to around 300,000
people and they gave an estimate of how this would be distributed across
the EU15 Member States provided all of them observed European Com-
munity rules in relation to the free movement of labour. They estimated
that the number of migrants from these States living in Sweden in 2005
would be about 6,700, while the number living in Ireland and the UK
would be around 3,400 and 12,600 respectively. Their estimate for the UK
was similar to an upper estimate of 12,600 persons per year made for the
Home Office by Dustmann et al. (2003). 
The conclusions in the European Commission reports were supported by
the experience of previous accessions. Fears that the accession of Spain
and Portugal in 1986 would lead to a mass influx of workers into existing
Member States proved unfounded.2 When Spain joined the EU in 1986
there were 109,000 Spanish nationals working in France. By 1994 this
figure had fallen to just 35,000. Net migration from Portugal and Greece
was approximately 7,700 and 10,000 respectively per annum between 1985
and 1997, whilst there was positive net migration from the EU to Spain
over the same period (Kvist 2004).
However, the EU10 enlargement took place in a context in which all but
three of the EU15 Member States adopted transitional arrangements which
restricted the free movement of labour. In previous enlargement rounds all
countries took the same stance in relation to the free movement of workers
except Luxembourg, which employed more restrictive measures when
Spain and Portugal joined. When enlargement negotiations for the EU10
2 At the accession of Spain and Portugal a seven year transitional period (which was
subsequently reduced to six years) was introduced. In the case of Greece a six year
transitional period was agreed.
states were completed in December 2002 transitional arrangements for the
free movement of labour, which would allow countries to postpone the
opening of their labour markets for a maximum period of seven years post-
accession, were provided for in the Nice Treaty. This treaty reformed the
institutional structure of the EU to cope with the enlargement. The seven
year transitional period is divided into three stages, according to the “2
plus 3 plus 2” formula (European Commission 2006). 
As a safeguard, provision was made in the Nice Treaty that countries
which decide to open their labour markets can at any stage reintroduce a
work permit system temporarily should they undergo or foresee any distur-
bances in their labour markets. At the end of the five-year post-accession
period Community rules regarding labour mobility should be introduced in
all Member States. However, a country documenting that it would experi-
ence “serious disturbances” in its labour market should it allow access to
the new Member States can prolong the transitional period for a further
two years. At each stage of the transitional period the decision whether or
not to open national labour markets is left to national Governments. From
1st May 2011 Community rules governing free movement of workers will
apply in all EU25 Member States.
Leaving the decision on whether or not to open the labour market to na-
tional Governments had important consequences. Germany and Austria,
who prior to accession were attracting two thirds of migrants from the
Accession States, as Boeri and Brücker (2005) note, made it clear immedi-
ately that they would be availing of the transitional arrangements to restrict
access to their labour markets for the full seven year period. Belgium, Fin-
land, France, Greece and Luxembourg declared that they would be impos-
ing tight restrictions on migrants from the Accession States for at least the
first two years after Enlargement. Italy, Portugal and Spain indicated that
they were in favour of the mobility of Accession State workers but did not
give a final decision on their policy. Therefore only five countries, Ireland,
the UK, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, announced on the signing
of the Accession Treaty in 2003 that, from the 1st of May 2004, citizens
from the Accession States would receive equivalent access to their labour
markets as citizens from the existing EU15.
However, the decision of Germany and Austria to restrict access to their
labour markets raised concerns in smaller Member States that potential mi-
gration to bigger Member States would be diverted elsewhere (Boeri and
Brücker 2005). Fuelled by fears of large labour influxes and “welfare
tourism”, a race to the top in terms of migration restrictions occurred
in the months preceding the enlargement date (Kvist 2004). Of the five
18
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countries who declared an open labour market policy, Denmark was the
first to have second thoughts. In December 2003 the Danish government
announced that permission to live and work in Denmark would only be
granted to people employed in jobs paid according to a tariff system of
minimum salaries. In addition workers from the Accession States would
have no access to the Danish social security system. The decisions fol-
lowed a year of negotiations between the Danish political parties. Follow-
ing the Danish U-turn, the Netherlands declared on the 23rd of January
2004 that they were reversing the decision made by the Kok II Govern-
ment in 2001. There would be a cap of 22,000 on the number of workers
from the new Member States allowed access to the Dutch labour market in
the first year post-enlargement. This decision is argued to have been based
on the deterioration of the Dutch labour market and a study by the Dutch
Central Plan Bureau which estimated that detrimental effects on the Dutch
labour market and the costs of enlargement on the social security system at
70 million euro. The Dutch Government also justified their change of posi-
tion by referring to the decisions of other governments to reverse their
positions after December 2002 (Kvist 2004). 
2.2 The Swedish Enlargement Debate3
In the debate that took place in Sweden between November 2003 and late
April 2004 there were basically three variations of the hypothesis that
EU10 nationals would go to Sweden to “benefit shop”. The “benefit
tourism” arguments were brought forward by different actors and are de-
scribed below. However, there were also two additional arguments. The
first concerned the fear of low wage competition, in particular from self-
employed persons. Moreover, the argument was often intertwined with the
“benefit tourism” hypothesis: that organised crime and unscrupulous em-
ployers would be able to use the Swedish social security system in order to
keep wage costs down (see Dagens Nyheter 2004; and Swedish Govern-
ment 2004).
The second argument concerned the risk of migration being diverted to
Sweden as a consequence of the country being one of very few to open its
labour markets. The re-direction argument came to the forefront in early
February 2004 when first the Dutch Government changed its position and
even more so when the British and the Irish Governments began to sway
on the issue. The situation was described as one where Sweden would
3 A fuller account of the Swedish pre-enlargement debate is provided in Appendix A and we
will therefore summarise only the most important arguments in the main text.
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stand alone with open borders (see, for example, Swedish Television
2004).4
The main pro-arguments for transitional rules were thus,
1. That the generous Swedish social security system would attract
people from the new Member States who would be able to use it to
support themselves and their families, either in Sweden or by export-
ing allowances to the family in their home country;
2. That organised crime and unscrupulous employers would use the
social security system to finance wages, putting strain on the
Swedish social security system;
3. That people from the new Member States should be entitled to pro-
tection so that they would not be taken advantage of due to their
weak position in the Swedish labour market;
4. That the Swedish labour market would be negatively affected by
wage competition;
5. That immigration would be higher as a consequence of restrictions
being imposed in all or the majority of the remaining EU15 Member
States, which would in turn aggravate the above mentioned problems.
Those who advocated open borders post-enlargement did so only partly by
positioning themselves against the pro-arguments described above. Several
observers pointed to the links between labour mobility and immigration on
the one hand and economic growth and demographic change on the other.
The latter aspect in particular occurred frequently in the debate (see, for
example, Sf 2004:43), either as a solution to the problem of an ageing
population, or, since the dependency ratios in EU10 in most cases are more
troublesome than in Sweden, as a fact that spoke against a large immigra-
tion of workers from Eastern Europe.
To summarise the counterarguments, those who opposed restrictions argued,
1. That Sweden had originally pledged to open its borders and should
not go back on its word;
2. That labour mobility is low in Europe, so immigration was likely to
be low even without transitional arrangements;
3. That a number of factors contradicted the “benefit tourism” hypo-
thesis, among other things that those who emigrate tend to be young,
4 This argument would serve as the main motivation (see the Government’s proposal, Skr.
2003/04:119, p. 24) for the Government’s proposal to the Swedish parliament regarding
transitional measures, even though there were no references to the re-direction argument at
the time of the Swedish Prime Minister’s u-turn in November 2003.
well educated and single; that the pro-arguments did not take into
account differences in costs of living between Sweden and the EU10
countries; that the new Member States experience deteriorating de-
pendency ratios; and that they are growing and dynamic economies
likely to have a strong domestic demand for labour;
4. That the economic gains from immigration were likely to outweigh
any economic losses.
In the end the Swedish Parliament voted against imposing restrictions and
European Community rules in relation to free movement of labour were
adopted in Sweden.
2.3 The UK Enlargement Debate
The Swedish Government’s announcement that it would propose transition-
al arrangements left Ireland and Britain exposed in Europe. The British
Labour Government came under pressure from the Conservative Party and
the British tabloid press and it began to rethink its migration policy
(Guardian, 2004). The tabloid press headlined an argument from the pres-
sure group Migration Watch that up to 40,000 immigrants per annum
would come to Britain from the new Member States following enlarge-
ment. In a study for the Home Office Dustmann et al. (2003) estimated
that the figure would be between 5,000 and 13,000 per annum. 
The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said he would have to consider
whether the British benefits system would attract an unmanageable number
of immigrants from the new Member States. On the 5th of February 2004
he stated “we will take whatever measures are necessary to make sure that
the ‘pull factor’ which might draw people here is closed off ”. The Home
Office announced, on the 23rd of February 2004, measures aimed at pro-
tecting the British labour market and ensuring that people could not come
to the UK simply to claim benefits. One of the measures was the introduc-
tion of a Worker Registration Scheme which placed an obligation on
Accession State nationals gaining employment as an employee to register
details with the Home Office (self-employed migrants are not required to
register under this scheme). The aim of the scheme is to ensure that the
British government can foresee any disturbances inflows may cause to the
labour market and thereby act swiftly to reintroduce a work permit system
for the Accession State nationals. To ensure that the British social welfare
system is protected workers must be working in the UK continuously for a
period of at least 12 months before they acquire full Treaty rights, includ-
ing access to benefits. Those who are economically inactive will receive no
benefits.
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2.4 The Irish Enlargement Debate
The Nice Treaty had a major influence on the enlargement debate in
Ireland as it was the only country that had to ratify the treaty in a referen-
dum. The treaty was initially rejected by the Irish electorate by 54 per cent
to 46 per cent in June 2001. This was a very embarrassing defeat for the
Irish Government and it decided it should hold another referendum on the
treaty to try and get it ratified. In the wake of the “no” vote, it reassured
the other Member States that it would honour the principle of freedom of
movement within the EU following enlargement. This undertaking was
criticised by the anti-Nice campaign groups. One of them, the National
Platform said:
This irresponsible commitment by the Government significantly changes the
argument about EU enlargement. It means that the Government has agreed to
bear the costs of potentially heavy East European migration to Ireland… with-
out any debate in the Dáil (Parliament), consultation with the public, or con-
sultation with the UK government, which could be significantly affected by this
Irish Government commitment. (Irish Times 3/7/2002)
Subsequent to this statement some of the anti-Nice campaigners claimed
that EU enlargement would lead to large numbers of Eastern European
workers undercutting Irish workers’ wages and to multinational businesses
moving to the East where wages were said to be one-third of those in Ire-
land.5 These claims were rejected by both the trade unions and the employ-
ers. A spokesman for the Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical
Union (SIPTU), the largest trade union in the country said that unneces-
sary fears were being raised about Ireland being subject to a “flood” of im-
migrants from candidate EU Member States. A spokeswoman for Irish
Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), the main employers’
organisation, said fears of large numbers of workers coming from the
candidate Member States were unfounded. The General Secretary of the
Irish Congress of Trade Unions and every major business organisation sub-
sequently endorsed these statements. 
The allegations about “floods” of immigrants eventually divided the anti-
Nice campaigners when the Socialist Workers Party, the Green Party and
Sinn Fein all said that they were opposed to the introduction of immigra-
tion as an issue in the debate on the Nice Treaty. Campaigners for the Nice
Treaty strongly rejected the argument that there would be “floods” of im-
5 The anti-Nice groups included No to Nice (led by an anti-abortion campaigner), the
National Platform, the Alliance against Nice (a broadly left grouping including the Socialist
Workers Party, Sinn Fein and the Green Party).
migrants and probably went too far in suggesting that the flows would be
minimal. For example, the government’s spokesman on the Nice Treaty,
Mr. Roche, said that:
Existing surveys on migration patterns in Europe show that the claims are false.
Ireland barely registers as a location in these surveys. The most recent research
in Hungary and Poland shows no interest whatsoever in Ireland as a work loca-
tion. (Irish Times 22/8/2002)
In the second referendum in October 2002 the electorate ratified the Nice
Treaty by 63 per cent to 37 per cent. After ratification of the Nice Treaty,
none of the major actors in the economic debate about enlargement ex-
pressed concerns about any adverse effects of immigration from Central
and Eastern Europe on pay and working conditions in Ireland. However,
the General Secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) said
in a Press Release on the 3rd of November 2005 that the ICTU had not
been consulted on the decision to open the labour market to the EU10
Member States and that the government had acted at the behest of the
business community. 
In the months preceding enlargement the decisions of other EU govern-
ments to restrict access to their labour markets did not affect the policy
stance of the Irish government. Employment growth in Ireland was 2.6 per
cent in 2003 and the unemployment rate was 4.5 per cent so there was
very nearly full employment. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and
Employment felt that the new Accession States would provide the bulk of
the employment needs for maintaining economic growth. In the year prior
to enlargement Ireland processed over 47,500 work permits, almost fifty
per cent of which went to Accession State nationals. The Taoiseach (Prime
Minister) stated that he believed “70 to 80” per cent of the work permit
jobs could be filled in the future by citizens from the new EU states
(Ahearn 2004). 
Given the economic conditions in Ireland the EU enlargement debate was
much more focused around protecting the welfare system from possible
abuse rather than around labour market issues. The decision by Britain to
close off welfare benefits to Accession State workers for a two year period,
therefore, had important consequences for Ireland. The decision by the
British government to impose restrictions in relation to benefits meant that
Ireland would be one of only two countries in Europe offering equal wel-
fare rights to Accession State nationals. An inter-departmental committee,
which had been set up by the Department of the Taoiseach in autumn 2003
to review the implications of the EU enlargement on the Irish State, in-
cluding housing and social welfare costs, was asked to reassess whether re-
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strictions were necessary in light of the UK decision. During the few
months before enlargement, the Government was urged by public lobby
groups, such as the Immigration Control Platform (ICP) and the National
Platform, to protect Ireland’s social welfare system. On the 24th of Febru-
ary 2004 the Taoiseach announced that Ireland would have to protect its
welfare and social benefits systems from possible abuse in light of EU en-
largement (Ahern 2004). An immediate concern for the government was to
protect the Common Travel Area (CTA) between Ireland and Britain by
having similar arrangements for the receipt of social benefits. On the 24th
of February the Minister of Social and Family Affairs announced:
Because of our common travel area with Britain it is now important that we put
in place some conditions… I will be proposing changes to the social welfare
code which will be no less robust than those introduced in Britain (DFSA Press
Release, 24 February 2004).
By the end of February the Irish Government introduced the Habitual
Residence Condition (HRC) which meant foreign nationals would have to
live in the CTA, comprising Ireland, the UK, the Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man, for at least two years, or meet certain other requirements, be-
fore being entitled to social assistance or child benefit. 
The HRC is an additional condition which must be satisfied along with the
other conditions for entitlement to welfare payments. Other factors, beside
the two-year residency requirement, are taken into consideration when de-
termining whether a person meets the HRC. These factors include: length
and continuity of stay; length and purpose of absence from Ireland; nature
and pattern of the employment; applicants connection with Ireland; and the
future intentions of the applicant (see www.dsfa.ie).
2.5 Outcome of the Pre-Enlargement Debates
The views of the various actors who participated in the enlargement
debates in Ireland, Sweden and the UK are summarised in Table 2.1. Al-
though there was support for transitional rules among the political parties
in Sweden the specific proposals made by different parties could not com-
mand majority support. In the absence of agreement, therefore, Sweden
adopted the EU Community rules. In the UK the decision to impose some
restrictions on access to social benefits and to introduce a Worker Regis-
tration Scheme was supported by the main political parties and accepted
by the general public as a necessary precaution. In Ireland the maintenance
of a common travel area with the UK was probably the factor which most
influenced the introduction of a habitual residence condition along the
lines of similar conditions found in other EU Member States. 
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Table 2
.1
 
The A
ctors and Their V
iew
s on Transitional R
ules
Ireland
Sweden
United Kingdom
*
Media
Unitary
The main newspapers and independent 
TV and radio stations were not in favour of 
transitional rules. The public service radio and 
television observed its obligation to remain 
neutral
Unitary
Major newspapers opposed. The public 
service radio and television observed its 
obligation to remain neutral.
Divided
A number of tabloids in favour, while the 
broadsheet press in general were opposed
Political 
parties in 
parliam
ent
Fianna Fail: opposed (in favour of Habitual 
Residence Condition)
Progressive Democrats: opposed (in favour of 
Habitual Residence Condition)
Fine Gael: opposed
Labour: opposed
Green Paper: opposed
Sinn Fein: opposed
Social Democratic Party: in favour
Moderate Party: opposed (in favour of 
restricting access to social security)
Liberal Party: in favour (major split within 
party)
Christian Democratic Party: opposed
Centre Party: opposed
Left Party: opposed
Green Party: opposed
Labour Party: opposed (W
orker Registration 
Scheme)
Conservative Party: in favour (work permits 
system)
Liberal Democrats: opposed
Unions and 
em
ployers
Unitary
The ICTU and IBEC did not oppose the 
restrictions 
Fairly unitary
The major players, LO, SACO, TCO and CSE, 
decided early on that no restrictions were 
needed. However, fi ve LO affi liates initially 
supported restrictions.
Fairly unitary
The major players, the TUC and the CBI, 
decided early on that no restrictions were 
needed.
Public 
opinion
Divided
Divided
According to three opinion polls, a large share 
of the public felt concern with respect to 
immigration after enlargement
Divided
Opinion polls prior to May 2004 showed fairly 
strong support for a toughening of immigration 
policy in the UK
* O
nly the three m
ajor parties in the U
nited K
ingdom
 have been included as the representations of other parties in the H
ouse of C
om
m
ons are sm
all.
Sources: H
ansard, Sveriges R
iksdag, Parliam
entary D
ebates D
áil Eireann, political parties’ publications, editorials and w
orking docum
ents
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The debates on enlargement in the EU15 Member States resulted in four
different transitional regimes as Table 2.2 shows. The first regime gives
citizens from the Accession States no more rights than non-EEA nationals.
Access to the labour market is only granted in exceptional circumstances,
through work permits, when an EEA citizen cannot fill the job vacancy.
The main means of entry, therefore, is through family reunification. This
regime applies to Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxem-
bourg and Spain. The second regime adopts essentially the same rule as
the first but opens the labour market to a quota of the Accession State na-
tionals. Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal have adopted
such a regime. 
The third regime is adopted by Ireland and the UK. They allow unrestrict-
ed access to their labour markets but restrict access to social benefits. In
the fourth regime European Community rules on the free movement of
labour are applied without any restrictions. Sweden is the only country im-
plementing the Community rules.
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3 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE
IN IMMIGRATION
Although the enlargement made large-scale migration to Ireland, Sweden
and the UK possible it did not necessarily mean that it would occur. There
are a number of factors besides labour market access that would influence
the decision of a citizen from the Accession States to migrate. These fac-
tors include income and unemployment differentials as important influ-
ences on the magnitude and direction of migration. The direction of the
flow is expected to be from countries with low GDP per capita and high
unemployment rates to countries with high incomes and low unemploy-
ment rates. The magnitude of the differentials in incomes and unemploy-
ment rates impact on the size of the migratory flow. As incomes in the
sending and receiving countries converge the propensity of the sending
country’s citizens to migrate decreases. Therefore, if incomes in the Acces-
sion States come closer to those of the Member States, by way of high
growth rates, the incentives for EU10 nationals to migrate will be reduced.
At the time of accession, average GDP per capita in the Accession States
was only a quarter of the average for the EU15 and it is estimated that it
would require between 20 and 30 years to catch up with the EU15 at cur-
rent growth rates (see Kvist 2005). Consequently, the income incentive for
accession state nationals to migrate is strong.
However, income disparities are not sufficient to induce migration from
the EU10 if there is no possibility of gaining employment. The level of un-
employment and job vacancies in the host country are important pull fac-
tors, as few people want to move to countries with no jobs. The relative
labour market situation is also important in determining whether migrant
workers from the Accession States choose to go to Ireland, Sweden or the
UK. A booming labour market in one country may divert potential immi-
grants from the other countries. 
Another factor identified as influencing a migrant’s choice of destination is
language. Studies have shown that countries with English as the main lan-
guage are preferable to migrants with high levels of education. Therefore,
Ireland and the UK may be more attractive destinations for high skilled
migrants than Sweden. Research by Barrett, Bergin and Duffy (2006) has
shown that the immigrant population in Ireland is characterised by high
educational levels. 
Geographic proximity is another important pull factor for migration. Coun-
tries closer to the home country are preferable targets for migration. This
would make Sweden a more attractive destination for EU10 migrants than
Ireland or the UK. Prior to accession two-thirds of the flows of Accession
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State nationals into Europe went to Germany and Austria, who share bor-
ders with five of the acceding countries.
An enlargement of immigration due to an expansion of the European com-
mon labour market may have various effects, positive and negative. The
size of these effects depends of course on the size of the increase in immi-
gration – a small increase in immigration means small effects. The effects
also depend on the composition of the new immigrants and the functioning
of the economy they are going to. Here we will discuss the types of effects
most highlighted in research and in the public debate. 
In the international debate “welfare magnets”6 has been a catchword just
like “social (benefit) tourism” and “welfare tourism” became catchwords
in the Swedish and Irish debates. These terms suggest that immigrants, at
least to some extent, are coming because the country of destination has a
highly developed welfare state with generous compensation for those who
are out of work. Some studies have related the selection of migrants to dif-
ferent countries or parts of a country (states in the United States) to the
generosity of the compensation schemes. Other studies have especially
studied immigrant representation in some parts of the welfare system, for
example social assistance. 
It is important to note that those schemes constitute only a minor part of
the total public sector budget. People living in a country, natives and immi-
grants, pay taxes and receive different forms of income transfers and
public consumption like education and health care. It is possible to relate
the costs of some forms of public services to the individuals using them,
the costs for other forms of public consumption relate to the size of the
population (which increases as a result of immigration), and finally some
costs relate to pure public goods that do not vary with changes in the size
of the population. The difference between the change in the taxes and the
sum of the change of the income transfers and public consumption due to
migration is the net transfer to the public sector from the migrants. 
The net transfer from the immigrants to the public sector may be positive
or negative. A factor supporting the presumption of a positive value of the
net transfer is that the new immigrants generally are of active age and that
the public sector mainly redistributes from people of active age to people
6 Borjas (1999) is the main advocate for this view using data on immigration to different
states in the US. Passel and Zimmermann (2001) do not find support for the welfare
magnet hypothesis in a study of the settlement pattern of immigrants in the US. Pedersen,
Pytlikova and Smith (2004) do not get support for the welfare magnet hypothesis in their
study which is based on international migration between a large number of countries.
of passive age (children and young people, and retired people). However,
there are also different forms of transfers within the group of people of
active age, mainly between those who have a job and those who do not
have a job or if they have a job and are not working, but are on sick leave,
for example. 
Studies of the net transfers from immigrants to the public sector in coun-
tries like Sweden show that the net transfers are positive for labour mi-
grants coming from western countries but negative for refugee immigrants
coming from non-western countries.7 The negative transfer for refugee im-
migrants is explained by the fact that few of them are integrated into the
labour market. This suggests that if immigrants from the Accession States
become integrated in the labour market, the net transfers will most likely
be positive, i.e. going from the immigrants to the public sector. However,
empirical studies are necessary to determine the actual outcome. The main
point of this discussion is that it is not sufficient to look at one program,
for example social assistance, to determine if the new immigration is a
burden for the welfare state. Higher costs for social assistance for immi-
grants than for natives may be more than compensated by the taxes paid by
the new migrants if a high proportion of them are working.
Another issue much discussed in the public debate is the effect on wages
of (an increase in) immigration. Immigration means generally an increase
in the labour force. An increase in the supply of a production factor can be
expected to lead to a decline in the price of that factor, i.e. to a decline of
wages. However, it is not as simple as that. First, an increased supply of
labour may induce new investments which may counteract the expected
wage decline. Second, labour is not a homogeneous factor of production.
The immigrant work force may be a complement in the production process
to the native work force and not a substitute, so that an increase in immi-
gration induces an increase in the wages of native workers. Hence, it is not
possible to determine the sign and size of the wage effect without em-
pirical studies. There are quite a few studies on the wage effects of immi-
gration for different countries and periods, most of them indicating only
small effects.8 Even if the effects are small on average and may go in both
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7 See Wadensjö (1973), Ekberg (1983, 1998, 1999) and Gustafsson and Österberg (2001) for
Sweden and Coleman and Wadensjö (1999), Wadensjö (2000, 2000a, 2002), Wadensjö and
Orrje (2002) and Wadensjö and Gerdes (2004) for Denmark, and Gott and Johnston (2002)
for the UK. Some surveys of studies in the field are found in Wadensjö and Orrje (2002),
Leibfritz, O’Brien and Poot (2003), and Chonicki (2004).
8 See Longhi, Nijkamp and Poot (2004) for a meta-study of a large number of studies on
wage effects. Borjas (2003) is one of the few who find large effects.
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directions, the effects in areas, sectors and occupations with a large in-
flow of immigrants may be larger. It is therefore of interest to study the
sectoral, occupational and regional distribution of immigrants compared to
that of the natives. 
Another area of discussion is if immigration influences the size and struc-
ture of unemployment.9 A common fear is that immigrants may displace
some of the native workforce so that they become unemployed. Such a dis-
cussion is generally based on an idea that the number of jobs is fixed, an
idea not based on knowledge of how the economy functions. The unem-
ployment rate is mainly determined by macroeconomic developments and
by economic policy. Sweden has a target range for inflation and if the in-
flation tends to be higher than the upper limit of the target range, the
Central Bank will increase the interest rate and by that increase the un-
employment rate. The unemployment rate following from such a policy is
the unemployment rate that is possible to maintain without getting an ac-
celerating inflation (NAIRU). If the immigrant unemployment rate is high-
er than the native unemployment rate this could be interpreted as if the im-
migrants are contributing relatively more to combat inflation. An argument
for a decline in NAIRU as a result of immigration is that immigrants are
more geographically mobile than natives on the labour market leading to
less wage inflation. An argument for an increase of NAIRU as a result of
immigration is that immigrants are less occupationally mobile on the
labour market (confined to fewer occupations) leading to a higher struc-
tural unemployment. However, immigration is probably not a significant
influence on the NAIRU. The relatively few empirical studies in this area
indicate that the effects of immigration on unemployment are small. 
Ireland’s currency is the Euro so it no longer has an independent monetary
policy. Consequently, it cannot change interest rates to try and influence
unemployment. It has, therefore, to rely on labour market policies to en-
sure that excessive earnings growth does not result in an increase in un-
employment. The main instrument which it uses to moderate earnings
growth is a social partnership agreement, usually covering three to four
years, negotiated between the employers, the trade unions and the govern-
ment. Since Ireland joined the Euro economists have recommended that
these agreements should incorporate a mechanism for the downward
adjustment of wages which would come into operation during a recession.
So far, these recommendations have fallen on stony ground.
9 Gilpin et al. (2006) is a recent study of much relevance for this study. The main result is
that the post-enlargement migration to the UK has not influenced the local unemployment
rate.
Immigration may also have other effects for example on prices and also on
influencing exports by forming networks between the country of origin and
the country of destination.10
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10 See Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin, and Wall (2006) for the effects of networks on export.
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4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION TO SWEDEN
FROM THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES11
4.1 Migration Flows by Country of Origin and Destination
There are several different types of international migration. Labour migra-
tion, refugee migration and family (re)union are the three most important
ones.12 For Sweden, labour migration dominated in the post-war period up
to the early 1970s. Most of the labour migrants arrived from the neigh-
bouring Nordic countries, especially Finland, and other European coun-
tries. The migrants typically came directly to work, in many cases recruited
in their home countries by Swedish employers. Due to the recession in the
early 1970s and in practice a stop for labour migration from outside the
common Nordic labour market (and later the European common labour
market), labour migration decreased drastically. As a result refugee migra-
tion and family (re)union dominated. Those coming for family (re)union
are in most cases coming to live with labour migrants and refugees who
have arrived earlier.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that labour migration has continued on a lower
level also during the last decade mainly from the countries belonging to
the Nordic common labour market or the European Union common labour
market. The direction of labour migration was mainly from countries with
lower income and wage levels than Sweden. The variations over time are
large, very sensitive to variations in the labour market situation in the
country of origin and especially in Sweden, the country of destination. As
noted, not many migrants go to countries that have few job vacancies. 
The migration from the Accession States will most likely be dominated by
labour migration and we can therefore expect large variation in size de-
pending on the Swedish labour market situation. 
The economic effects of the enlargement of the European Union labour
market are primarily dependent on the size of the new migration. Crucial
for all predictions of the effects are predictions of the size of the new im-
11 There are a few follow-up studies of immigration from the Accession States after the
enlargement of the European Union. See Dølvik and Eldring (2005) for the migration to
the Nordic countries, and Commission of the European Communities (2006) comparing
migration from the EU10 and the EU15 to all EU15 countries. Note that the numbers based
on residence permits in the latter study are strongly misleading regarding the immigration
from EU15 countries to Sweden. Danish and Finnish citizens who constitute the majority of
immigrants from other EU15 countries in Sweden do not need a residence permit.
12 Nilsson (2004) contains a detailed presentation of migration to and from Sweden in the
post-war period.
35
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Net Migration EmigrationImmigration
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
88
19
87
Figure 4.1 Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration, 
Sweden, 1987-2005 
Source: Statistics Sweden
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migration.13 In this section we will present the development of the number
and composition of immigrants from the EU10 countries before and after
the enlargement. It will be an incomplete picture for different reasons.
First, not all immigrants in Sweden are registered. Second, and more im-
portantly, the share registered may have changed: it is likely that some im-
migrants who lived and worked in Sweden for a period before enlargement
but who were not registered may have registered as a result of the legal
change. We also cannot exclude that immigration from other countries,
registered and unregistered, may have declined as a result of the acces-
sion agreement. Employers who earlier employed immigrants from other
countries may have turned to employing immigrants from the Accession
States.
It is also important to study emigration to the Accession States. Emigration
to those states will mainly be return migration of earlier immigrants. Given
13 The predictions of the size and the effects of migration made before the enlargement of the
European Union vary. See for example Boeri, Hanson and MacCormick (2002), Dustmann
et al. (2003), Eriksson (2004), Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2004) and Sinn and Ochel
(2003). The study most critical of free migration for citizens of the accession states is Sinn
and Ochel (2003). They argue that migration without restriction would lead to a dismantling
of the welfare state. 
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14 Note that tables corresponding to the figures presented in the main text can be found in
Appendix 2.
the propensity to re-emigrate return migration may increase because the
immigrant population living in Sweden becomes larger. However, it may
also increase if the deregulation of immigration makes it more attractive to
return so that it will be possible to immigrate to Sweden again after a
period in the home country. The decision to go back to the home country
is easy to change if it is regretted.
We will first look at the flows of immigrants and emigrants from the ten
Accession States in the period 2000-2005. Immigration and emigration is
here defined as the number of people who intend to move to or from the
country for more than one year. See Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3.14 We will
underline some of the main results.
• The total numbers show that there was an increase in immigration during
the first years of the decade but a much higher increase in 2004 and
2005. That the increase continued in 2005 is an indication that it was not
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Figure 4.2 Composition of Immigration to Sweden According to 
Country of Birth, 1987-2005
Note: EU14 = EU15 minus Sweden. Prior to 1991 immigrants from Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania were citizens of the Soviet Union and prior to 1993 immigrants from Czech Republic 
and Slovakia were citizens of Czechoslovakia.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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only a result of higher registration, i.e. a registration effect, but a real in-
crease. However, immigration from the EU10 countries is still only a
small part of the total immigration to Sweden.
• Emigration to the Accession States also increased but to a much smaller
extent than immigration (Cyprus and Malta are the only exceptions). Net
immigration is a large part of gross immigration. It should be noted that
return migration is probably considerably underestimated which means
that the net immigration is overestimated. 
• Women have constituted the majority of immigrants from the EU10
countries in all years of the period. At the same time the fact that most
of the emigrants are men indicates that male immigrants are returning to
a greater extent. Immigration of men has increased more than immigra-
tion of women in 2004 and 2005. As a result almost the same number of
men and women migrated to Sweden from the ten Accession States in
2005. 
• More than half of the immigrants to Sweden from the ten Accession
States are from Poland. The relative importance of immigration from
37
Figure 4.3 Immigration and Emigration to and from the 
Accession States, Sweden, 2000-2005
Note: Im = Immigrants, Em = Emigrants
Source: Statistics Sweden
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Poland greatly increased in 2004 and 2005. This is not surprising as
Poland is the largest of the EU10 countries and a neighbour to Sweden
on the other side of the Baltic Sea.15 After Poland immigration is largest
from the three Baltic states, especially Lithuania and Estonia.
Immigration has increased considerably from the Accession States, espe-
cially from Poland, but it is still small compared to the total immigration
and the size of the Swedish labour market. Why is this so? One explana-
tion may be that there have been few job vacancies available for newly ar-
rived immigrants. The Swedish unemployment rate is low compared to that
in several other European countries and it is presently declining, but job
growth has been low and job vacancies few. Another explanation may be
that the propensity to emigrate has been lower than many expected in
the Accession States. An interview survey of migration intentions in the
Baltic states carried out a few years before the accession date shows that
the willingness to move abroad was not very high and also that only a few
had the Nordic countries (including Sweden) as the preferred destination
(Brunoskis, Djuve and Haualand 2003). A third explanation is that those
migrating have chosen Ireland and the UK instead of Sweden due to easier
access to the labour market in those countries and not least that English is
the language of those two countries. 
4.2 The New Immigrants and the Labour Market
We will now turn to the immigrants from the Accession States and their
position on the Swedish labour market. We will start with those who
arrived in the period from 2003 to 2005 and who have been granted
residence permits. A residence permit according to the European Econom-
ic Area (EEA) Agreement is a requirement for any EEA national who
wishes to stay for longer than three months in an EEA country.16 Figure 4.4
gives some basic information. See also Table A.2.4, where we have included
15 Poland with a fast growing and changing economy is not only a country of origin for inter-
national migration but also a country of destination for especially people coming from some
of the successor states to the Soviet Union. See Iglicka (2005) and also Iglicka et al. (2005).
A comparison with the migration statistics of other countries for the same migration flows
indicates that international migration is probably much under-estimated in Polish statistics.
16 In other words, whereas immigration and emigration as described above cover those who
migrate on a more long-term basis, i.e. for more than one year, the statistics on EEA
residence permits illustrate the short-term movements to Sweden. Furthermore, we would
like to point out that we are very much in the dark with regard to those who go to Sweden
for less than three months. However, a reasonable estimate is that these flows, as is the case
with both the long- and the short-term migration flows, has doubled. Since 15,496 work
permits were issued to EU10 nationals in 2003, out of which 6,433 concerned seasonal
work, it is reasonable to assume that the number is within the range of 10,000-30,000 per
year.
the four countries of origin with most immigrants and the aggregate infor-
mation for all coming from the ten Accession States and as a comparison
those coming from the twelve old member states (according to the rules of
the common Nordic labour market, citizens from Denmark and Finland do
not need a residence permit). The number of residence permits for citizens
from the ten Accession States increased both in 2004 and 2005. The in-
crease is large for the categories employers and consultants which may in-
clude self-employed people, for example in the building sector.
Immigration of self-employed was a concern of the LO prior to enlarge-
ment (see appendix A.1 on the Swedish pre-enlargement debate). In late
2004, only a few months after the EU enlargement, there was a conflict in
the municipality of Vaxholm north of Stockholm, where a Latvian com-
pany was contracted to refurbish a school. The case is described in Box
4.1. However, it is important to stress that the incident did not concern
the freedom of movement for workers, but rather the free movement of
services, and the workers concerned in this and similar cases would not
necessarily appear in the statistics on residence permits.
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In the autumn of 2004 a confl ict arose in the municipality of Vaxholm north of Stock-
holm. L&P Baltic AB, a subsidiary to the Latvian company Laval un Partneri, had won a 
contract in May 2004 from the Vaxholm municipality to refurbish a school (Söderfjärds-
skolan). L&P Baltic AB employed Latvian workers posted in Sweden.
In June 2004 the Swedish Building Workers’ Union (Byggnads) contacted L&P Baltic AB 
and requested that the company sign a collective agreement – in this case an application 
agreement, since the employer was not a member of the Swedish employer’s union. In 
September the same year the parties had not managed to reach an agreement. The  Latvian 
company argued that a Latvian agreement already existed and in the negotiations on 
 wages, Byggnads demanded that the Latvian company pay their workers the average 
hourly wage in the Stockholm area, SEK 145 (ca €16), later lowered to SEK 138 (ca 
€15). The Latvian company would only agree to pay SEK 109 (ca €12), which was at the 
very low end of the interval in the agreements. In early November 2004 Byggnads took 
industrial action and launched a blockade. Sympathy actions were taken in December by 
the Swedish Electricians’ Union (Elektrikerförbundet).
In the same month, L&P Baltic AB asked the Swedish Labour Court for an interim de-
cision prohibiting the confl ict actions. The Labour Court rejected these claims, since, 
according to the Court, the company had not been able to show probable cause for its 
claims. L&P Baltic AB sued the concerned Swedish trade unions before the Labour 
Court, arguing that the confl ict actions were in breach of EU law. On the 29th of April the 
Swedish Labour Court decided that it was necessary to ask the European Court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling as to whether the Swedish unions had violated articles 12 and 49, 
EC Treaty, and/or the Posting of Workers Directive. L&P Baltic AB fi led a petition for 
bankruptcy in Latvia in early 2005.
The European Court of Justice is not expected to give a fi nal judgement before 2007.
Box 4.1 The Vaxholm Case
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Figure 4.4 Residence Permits for Accession State Nationals 
2004-2005 According to the EEA Agreement
Note: Reasons for granting a permit are up to May 2004 estimated for those coming from the 
Accession States.
Source: Migrationsverket (Swedish Migration Board)
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However, also the number of residence permits granted to students is in-
creasing, and even more to those who are relatives of people living in Swe-
den. Note that the number of residence permits reported in Figure 4.4 is
greater than the number of immigrants according to Figure 4.3. There may
be several explanatory factors. People arriving in the year after a residence
permit is granted, a lag in the reporting of immigration and that not all of
those receiving a residence permit are coming to Sweden are some likely
explanations.
The next step is to look at the labour market situation of the new migrants.
This is however not easy to do. The statistical data bases with information
on the labour market which cover the period after the accession of the
ten member states are surveys, mainly the labour force surveys, and the
samples are not large enough to be of any use for a study of the new
migrants.
We have instead used data containing information on all the population liv-
ing in Sweden. The latest year for which this data set is available is 2004.
This means that we do not have any information for immigrants arriving in
2005 and 2006. A further problem is that even if the population included
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are those who are registered as living in Sweden in the end of the year (for
those coming from the Accession States the criterion is that they have a
residence permit and are registered as living in Sweden on December 31),
the employment information is for November. It means that the data set
does not include labour status information on people who arrived in
December (and maybe also in November) of the year studied. We only
know that they arrived and were living in Sweden at the end of the year. In
practice we do not have any information on the labour market situation for
the majority of those who have arrived after the enlargement of the EU.
What we can do, and have done, is to look at the labour market situation
for people who were born in one of the ten Accession States and were
living in Sweden at the end of 2003 and 2004, respectively. Note that this
data is on the stock of immigrants in Sweden and not on flows of immi-
grants to Sweden. We will start with the employment rates for those who
were born in the ten Accession States and as a comparison the correspond-
ing information for Sweden. See Figure 4.5.
The employment rates for those from the Accession States are about the
same in both 2003 and 2004 and in both years considerably lower than for
people born in Sweden (but larger than for refugee immigrants according
to information from the labour force surveys17). A closer look behind the
figures show that among those not employed that are from the Accession
States, many do not have any income, not even an income from the income
transfer programs (unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, pensions
etc.). This category may hide several different groups. The first one, and a
not very large group, consists of those who have immigrated to Sweden in
December and who could not have worked in Sweden in November the
same year (it will be possible to exclude this group in a revised estima-
tion). The second one consists of immigrants who have (re) emigrated
without notifying the tax authorities about it. We do not know the size of
this group. A third group consists of students (in secondary level and in
higher education) who do not combine studies with work. A fourth group
17 European Commission (2006) gives information on employment rates based on Labour
Force Surveys for 2004 and 2005. For citizens from the EU10 the employment rate was
62 per cent in 2004 in Sweden. This is slightly higher value than that shown in Figure 4.5
and Table A.2.5. There are two main candidates for an explanation of the difference. One
possible explanation is that the populations are different; citizens of EU10 countries or
people born in the EU10 countries. However, a re-estimation of Table A.2.5 with citizens of
EU10 as the population shows even lower employment rates. The explanation may instead
be that data collecting methods are different. In the labour force only those participating in
the survey are included. Those who have left the country without registering in it are not
included. A problem with the labour force surveys is that those employed may be over-
represented among those answering, leading to a selection problem. 
is people who are not working and are supported by other family members,
for example housewives. A fifth group consists of people who work in the
unregistered part of the economy (the shadow economy). We do not have
any estimates of the size of this group.
Figure 4.6 shows the industry distribution for those who were born in
EU10 countries and as a comparison those who were born in Sweden.
The distributions are somewhat different. The main difference is that those
coming from EU10 are overrepresented in the health care sector, a sector
characterized by a high demand for labour. Those born in Sweden are
overrepresented in construction and public administration.
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Figure 4.5 Employment Rate in September Among Those Aged 
16-64 According to Country of Origin, Living in 
Sweden at the End of 2003 and 2004
Note: As those who immigrated to Sweden in December cannot have been employed 
in Sweden in November the same year the employment rates for the immigrants are 
underestimated. There are immigrants who have arrived from the areas of the present states 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as immigrants from the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those from others registered as 
immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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4.3 Wages and Education
Even if the employment rate estimations have to be interpreted with care,
information on working hours and wages for those employed do not have
the same problem. In Figure 4.7 information on working hours in Septem-
ber 2003 and 2004 are shown. There are only small differences between
those born in Sweden and those born in the EU10 countries. There is a
variation in working hours among the ten countries (see Table A.2.7 in Ap-
pendix 2) and between the two years which may be explained by the fact
that there are few observations so that outliers have a large influence.
Figure 4.8 shows the monthly average wage (recalculated to full-time
monthly wage for those not working full-time) for people who were born
in the ten Accession States and in Sweden. The average monthly wage is
lower for those born in the Accession States than in Sweden, even though
the difference is less than ten per cent. Also here there are differences be-
tween those coming from different countries (see Table A.2.8 in Appendix
2) and it should be stressed that some groups contain only a small number
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Figure 4.6 Distribution of People Born in the Accession States 
and in Sweden According to Industry in September 
2004; Per cent
Source: Statistics Sweden
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of individuals. There are differences in the composition according to age
and education which may contribute to explain the differences. We will
look at the educational distribution and after that report some results from
estimations of the Mincer equation.
Figure 4.9 shows that the educational level is on the average higher among
those coming from the Accession States than for those born in Sweden.
There are large variations between the different Accession States (see Table
A.2.9 in Appendix A.2). Note also that we are missing information for a
larger share of the immigrants than for those born in Sweden. It is mainly
for the newly arrived information on education is missing.
We have estimated Mincer equations with the logarithm of the monthly
full-time wage as the dependent variable, and as independent variables age,
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Figure 4.7 Working Hours in September Among Those Aged 
16-64 According to Country or Origin in September 
2003 and 2004
Note: Only those employed are included. There are immigrants who have arrived from the 
areas of the present states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as 
immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those 
from others registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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age squared, female, educational levels and either dummy variables for be-
ing an immigrant from the different EU10 countries or a dummy variable
for coming from any of them (see Table 4.1). The result for the coefficient
of the EU10-dummy is a negative value indicating a negative wage premi-
um of about ten per cent (separate estimations for men and women have
also been made, which indicate a slightly less negative value for immigrant
women than for immigrant men). When dummies for the different coun-
tries are included in the estimations, the coefficients of all the dummies
are negative (those born in Sweden is the reference group), but the value
of the coefficient varies. It is lower in absolute terms for immigrants com-
ing from countries from which many have stayed for long periods in Swe-
den, which could be explained by the fact that integration takes time.
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Figure 4.8 Monthly Wage Among Those Aged 16-64 According 
to Country of Origin in September 2003 and 2004; 
in Thousands SEK
Note: For those working less than full-time the wage is recalculated to full-time wage. Only 
those employed are included. There are immigrants who have arrived from the areas of the 
present states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as immigrants 
from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those from others 
registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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We have re-estimated the equations with dummies for the period of arrival
and get as expected that the earlier the immigrants have arrived the smaller
is the wage disadvantage (see Table 4.2). For those who have arrived be-
fore 1970 the difference is less than 3 per cent and for those who have ar-
rived in the period 2000-04 the difference is 20 per cent.
4.4 Welfare magnet? Effects for the Public Sector of the
New Immigration
As mentioned in the first section, the parts of the welfare state most dis-
cussed in connection with the expansion of the European Union are not
very large items in the budget of the public sector. Nevertheless it may be
of interest to follow up what has happened in the two areas most dis-
cussed: social assistance and support for family members (children) not
living with the parent in Sweden but in another European Union country.
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Figure 4.9 Distribution of People Born in One of the Accession 
States and in Sweden According to Education in 
2004; Per cent
Source: Statistics Sweden
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Table 4.1 Wage equation estimates with log monthly wage at 
full time work in 2004 as the dependent variable
Male Female All Male Female All
Constant 8.989 (0.0042)
9.015 
(0.0047)
9.057 
(0.0032)
8.989 
(0.0042)
9.015 
(0.0047)
9.057 
(0.0032)
Female -0.148 (0.0006)
-0.148 
(0.0006)
Age 0.0377 (0.0002)
0.0362 
(0.0002)
0.0368 
(0.0002)
0.0377 
(0.0003)
0.0362 
(0.0002)
0.0368 
(0.0002)
Age squared -0.00035 (0.000003)
-0.00037 
(0.000002)
-0.00037 
(0.000002)
-0.00035 
(0.000003)
-0.00037 
(0.000002)
-0.00037 
(0.000002)
Primary school 9 or 
10 years
0.086 
(0.0015)
0.052 
(0.0019)
0.073 
(0.0012)
0.086 
(0.0016)
0.052 
(0.0019)
0.073 
(0.0012)
Secondary School 0.165 (0.0014)
0.109 
(0.0017)
0.146 
(0.0011)
0.165 
(0.0014)
0.109 
(0.0017)
0.146 
(0.0011)
Higher education 
less than two years
0.360 
(0.0019)
0.272 
(0.0025)
0.333 
(0.0015)
0.360 
(0.0019)
0.272 
(0.0025)
0.333 
(0.0015)
Higher education two 
years or more
0.502 
(0.0018)
0.359 
(0.0019)
0.446 
(0.0014)
0.502 
(0.0018)
0.359 
(0.0019)
0.447 
(0.0014)
Post graduate 
education
0.732 
(0.0049)
0.689 
(0.0075)
0.717 
(0.0042)
0.732 
(0.0049)
0.689 
(0.0075)
0.717 
(0.0042)
Czech Republic -0.179 (0.071)
-0.107 
(0.043)
-0.144 
(0.042)
Czechoslovakia -0.039 (0.017)
-0.016 
(0.016)
-0.032 
(0.012)
Cyprus -0.074 (0.050)
-0.065 
(0.054)
-0.072 
(0.038)
Estonia -0.073 (0.021)
-0.121 
(0.015)
-0.105 
(0.013)
Hungary -0.093 (0.010)
-0.059 
(0.011)
-0.079 
(0.007)
Latvia -0.134 (0.040)
-0.160 
(0.030)
-0.159 
(0.025)
Lithuania -0.126 (0.074)
-0.254 
(0.033)
-0.226 
(0.033)
Malta -0.086 (0.085)
-0.140 
(0.046)
-0.097 
(0.063)
Poland -0.123 (0.006)
-0.104 
(0.004)
-0.116 
(0.004)
Slovakia -0.120 (0.054)
-0.101 
(0.056)
-0.121 
(0.040)
Slovenia -0.071 (0.030)
-0.104 
(0.037)
-0.085 
(0.023)
EU10 -0.104 (0.005)
-0.096 
(0.004)
-0.103 
(0.003)
R squared 0.298 0.260 0.311 0.298 0.260 0.311
Note: Standard errors within parentheses.
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Table 4.2 Wage equation estimates with log monthly wage 
at full time work in 2004 as the dependent 
variable and time of arrival to Sweden among the 
explanatory variables
Male Female All
Constant 8.988(0.0042)
9.015
(0.0047)
9.057
(0.0032)
Female -0.148(0.0006)
Age 0.0377(0.0002)
0.0362
(0.0002)
0.0369
(0.0002)
Age squared -0.00035(0.000003)
-0.00037
(0.000003)
-0.00036
(0.000002)
Primary school 9 or 10 years 0.086(0.0015)
0.051
(0.0019)
0.073
(0.0012)
Secondary School 0.165(0.0014)
0.109
(0.0017)
0.146
(0.0011)
Higher education less than two years 0.360(0.0019)
0.272
(0.0025)
0.333
(0.0015)
Higher education two years or more 0.502(0.0018)
0.358
(0.0019)
0.447
(0.0013)
Post graduate education 0.732(0.0049)
0.689
(0.0075)
0.717
(0.0042)
Arrived before 1970 -0.028(0.013)
-0.007
(0.014)
-0.022
(0.010)
Arrived from EU10 1970-74 -0.096(0.014)
-0.018
(0.013)
-0.063
(0.009)
Arrived from EU10 1975-79 -0.101(0.014)
-0.041
(0.011)
-0.072
(0.009)
Arrived from EU10 1980-84 -0.130(0.010)
-0.066
(0.008)
-0.099
(0.006)
Arrived from EU10 1985-89 -0.132(0.010)
-0.110
(0.008)
-0.122
(0.006)
Arrived from EU10 1990-94 -0.137(0.015)
-0.154
(0.009)
-0.153
(0.008)
Arrived from EU10 1995-99 -0.072(0.022)
-0.178
(0.012)
-0.146
(0.011)
Arrived from EU10 2000-04 -0.165(0.025)
-0.226
(0.014)
-0.202
(0.013)
R squared 0.298 0.260 0.311
Note: Standard errors within parentheses.
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Figure 4.10 Number of Applications for Social Assistance 
Granted Accession State Nationals Aged 16 and 
Older According to Country of Citizenship and 
Country of Origin in 2003 and 2004
Source: Socialstyrelsen (The National Board of Health and Welfare)
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Figure 4.10 shows the number of applications for social assistance in 2003
and 2004 granted to people who are citizens in one of the ten Accession
States or who were born in one of those states. It is clear from the table
that there is, in practice, not any increase in the number of applications
granted (a slight decline for citizens and a slight increase for foreign born).
Social (benefit) tourism is not evident, therefore, in this part of the welfare
state.18
Different forms of support to family members living in another country
may be paid according to EU-rules. Information on such payments from
March-December 2004 has been published (for the ten Accession States
payments are only for the period since May 2004).19 The study shows that
18 It should be noted, however, that the table only shows the number of applications by EU10
nationals and not actual sums paid out.
19 See Lönnqvist (2005) for the development up to 2005, and also RFV (2004) for an earlier
report of the development in the first months after the EU-enlargement.
the total payments of this type are low, c. SEK 82 million (€8.8 million).
The major part goes to the neighbouring countries Norway, Denmark and
Finland. Only 1 (one) per cent of this amount (c. SEK 0.9 million or €0.01
million), is paid to family members living in one of ten Accession States.
Social (benefit) tourism for family support has not, therefore, been a
“pull” factor for immigrants from the EU10 countries.
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5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION TO IRELAND
FROM THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES
5.1 Migration Flows in Aggregate and from the Accession
States
Migratory flows have long played an important role in determining the
structure of the Irish population and labour market. The Irish experience
from the late 1980s to date has shown that migratory flows to and from Ire-
land are very sensitive to economic conditions not only in Ireland but also
in the countries of destination/origin of migrants. For example, the global
downturn that occurred in the early 1980s was accentuated by inappropriate
domestic economic policies and it had a particularly severe impact on the
Irish economy, resulting in the country languishing in recession until the
early part of the 1990s. By 1986 the unemployment rate had reached over
17 per cent. This created a significant divergence in labour market condi-
tions between Ireland and other countries, particularly the United Kingdom,
which led to a sharp rise in emigration, as Figure 5.1 shows. The net out-
flows were very high at the end of the decade – almost 45,000 in 1988/89,
or 13.0 per thousand of the population. The economy began to stabilise in
the early 1990s. Unemployment decreased and the net migration balance
hovered close to zero. Unattractive labour market conditions abroad, due to
the renewed onset of global recession, meant the emigration option was no
longer attractive and many former Irish emigrants began to return home.
The resulting pressure on the labour market caused unemployment to rise to
nearly 16 per cent in 1993, compared with 13 per cent in 1990.
However, in the period from 1995 to 2000 the Irish economy experienced a
major reversal in fortune. Real annual GNP growth averaged almost 9 per
cent and the estimated net jobs created totalled 389,000, or over 5 per cent
on an annual average basis for the period. Even though the labour force
continued to expand throughout this period, this occurred at a much slower
pace, and by April 2000 the unemployment rate had fallen to 4.3 per cent.
The improvement in Irish economic conditions relative to its EU partners
in the 1990s led to a reversal in the migratory trend experienced in the
1980s; Ireland began to experience positive net migration. As the unprece-
dented employment growth eventually gave rise to labour shortages, Ire-
land experienced a rapid increase in the influx of foreign workers which
relaxed the constraint on labour supply. These came not only from the
EU15 but also from a wide range of other countries, particularly the Baltic
States, mainly under the work permits system. 
The boom period of the Irish economy peaked around the turn of the cen-
tury. Nevertheless, annual GNP growth averaged 4 per cent for the period
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Figure 5.1 Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration, Ireland, 
1987-2005 (year ending April)
Source: CSO Population and Migration Estimates, various editions
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from 2000-2005 and employment continued to increase, albeit at a slower
rate. However due to the fall in the unemployment rate in the late 1990s, the
potential domestic supply of labour from which employers could draw had
also fallen. Hence, Ireland became an attractive location for many immi-
grants, particularly those from outside the EU, and net migration continued
to increase reaching 30,000 in 2003, 35,000 in 2004 and 53,400 in 2005. 
It is evident from Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2005) migration estimates
in Figure 5.2 that from the mid-1990s onwards an increasing number of im-
migrants came from the Rest of the World20 (ROW) including the Central
and Eastern European states. The only year for which the number of immi-
grants from the Accession States can be identified is 2005 when they ac-
counted for 26,400 of the 35,400 immigrants from the Rest of the World. 
Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of net inward migration accounted for by
immigrants from the Rest of the World, i.e. nationals from countries outside
the EU and the USA. The Rest of World proportion of total immigration in-
creased from 16.3 per cent in 2000 to 35 per cent by 2003. It fell slightly to
30 per cent in 2004 before increasing sharply to 50 per cent in 2005.
20 The Rest of the World includes immigrants from all countries excluding nationals of
Ireland, the EU15 and the USA.
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Figure 5.2 Immigration Flows From the Accession States, 
1987-2005
Source: CSO Population and Migration Estimates, various editions
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At the time of accession the Irish economy was in a strong position. GDP
growth was the highest in Europe, at 4.5 per cent, and unemployment, at
4.4 per cent, was the lowest. Since accession, the Irish labour market has
continued to perform strongly. Employment growth reached 4.7 per cent in
2005, its highest level since 2000, and unemployment remained low at 4.4
per cent. Open access to the labour market coupled with a continuing
strong demand for labour have, therefore, attracted large and growing
numbers of immigrants from the Accession States to Ireland. 
The increased immigration to Ireland resulted in the foreign born popula-
tion reaching 259,000, or 6.3 per cent of the total population in April
2005. This compares with 3.2 per cent in April 1996. Unfortunately these
data cannot be disaggregated to provide a figure for Accession State na-
tionals. These nationals were aggregated in the “Other” category which
currently represents 32 per cent of the foreign population in Ireland, com-
pared to 15 per cent (18,100) in 1996. The latest Quarterly National
Household Survey (QNHS) for the fourth quarter of 2005 provides an esti-
mate of approximately 73,000 for the number of Accession State nationals
aged 15 and over who are living in Ireland.
5.2 The Stock of Accession State Workers in Ireland.
Data on the stock of EU10 workers in Ireland is sourced from the CSO’s
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). Unfortunately the QNHS
does not provide information on the stock of Accession State nationals in
employment in Ireland prior to the third quarter of 2004. Therefore to get
an idea of the stock of EU10 nationals in Ireland prior to the accession
date it is necessary to examine the Rest of the World category in which
they were aggregated. See Figure 5.4.
The Rest of the World category increased throughout the post accession
period. In Q2 2004, prior to accession, the stock of workers from ROW
countries was 51,000. By Q4 2005 this figure had more than doubled to
109,000. Of the Non-EU workers employed in Ireland in the fourth quarter
of 2005, 61,600 were EU10 nationals. This compares with a figure of
28,100 in the previous year
Accession State nationals have a much higher labour force participation
rate than Irish nationals; 90 per cent versus 62 per cent. Since the enlarge-
ment date the number of EU10 nationals in employment in Ireland has in-
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Figure 5.5 ILO Status of Accession State Nationals Aged 15 
and Over, Q3 2004 to Q4 2005
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Surveys
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creased more than three-fold from 19,500 in Q3 2004 to 61,600 in Q4
2005 (see Figure 5.5). This means that EU10 nationals have accounted for
approximately half of the jobs created in Ireland since accession. The aver-
age quarterly employment growth rate of the EU10 nationals is 26 per cent
for the post-accession period. This compares with a figure of 0.9 per cent
for Irish nationals. It must be noted that the Irish unemployment rate has
been low and stable at around 4.4 per cent throughout the post-accession
period. The unemployment rate of EU10 nationals has been even lower at
an average of 2.4 per cent. Although the number of EU10 nationals who
describe themselves as economically inactive has increased from 4,000 in
Q3 2004 to 7,400 in Q4 2005 they represent a decreasing proportion of the
total number of EU10 nationals aged 15 and over.
Figure 5.6 shows the employment of accession state workers in Ireland by
NACE sector in Q4 2004 and Q4 2005. The figures show that the majority
of EU10 workers are in the construction and manufacturing (other produc-
tion industries) sectors. These sectors employ over half of the Accession
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Figure 5.6 Employment of Accession State Nationals by NACE 
Sector, Q4 2004 and Q4 2005
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey Q4 2005
State workforce in Ireland. However, as we can see from Figure 5.7, Acces-
sion State nationals accounted for only 6.0 per cent of total construction
workers and 5.5 per cent of total industrial workers in Q4 2005. The sector
with the highest proportion of EU10 workers is the hotels and restaurants
sector. In Q4 2005 this sector was employing over 8,600 accession state
nationals, 7.4 per cent of all those employed in the sector.
The distribution of workers from the Accession States by sector in Ireland
is very different from the distribution in Sweden. In Ireland there is a big
concentration in the construction, manufacturing and hospitality sectors
whereas in Sweden there is a distribution across all sectors which is simi-
lar to the distribution of Swedish workers across sectors. The main excep-
tion in Sweden is the health sector in which 22 per cent of Accession State
nationals work compared with 16 per cent of Swedish workers.
Figure 5.8 shows employment levels in the Irish economy by NACE sec-
tors. It is evident that overall employment in the Irish labour market also
57
Figure 5.7 Employment of Accession State Nationals by NACE 
Sector as a Proportion of the Total Workforce in 
Ireland, Q4 2004 and Q4 2005
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey Q4 2005
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increased during the period from the fourth quarter of 2004 to the fourth
quarter of 2005. All of the broad labour market sectors experienced in-
creases except for other production industries. 
Prior to enlargement workers from the EU10 countries had to obtain a
work permit in order to work in Ireland. The data in Figure 5.9 indicates
that the number of work permits issued to them increased from 13,330 in
2001, or 36 per cent of the total, to 16,600 in 2003, or 35 per cent of the
total. In 2004 work permits data for EU10 workers only run until the end
of April as beyond that date work permits were no longer required by them
to work in Ireland. Examining data for the period from the 1st of January
2004 to the 31st of April 2004, almost 5,300 work permits were issued to
EU10 workers, this represented 40 per cent of all permits issued in that
period. The total number of work permits fell from 47,500 in 2003 to
34,000 in 2004, and to 20,400 in 2005. The sharp decrease in the number
of work permits issued following enlargement suggests that the Irish
Government’s policy of sourcing most of the country’s requirements for
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Figure 5.8 Employment in Ireland by NACE sector, Q4 2004 
and Q4 2005
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey Q4 2005
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foreign workers from within the enlarged EU is being successfully im-
plemented. 
5.3 Flows of Accession State Nationals into Ireland
Personal Public Service Numbers (PPSNs) are individual identifiers re-
quired in order to gain employment in Ireland or to access state benefits
and public services. An individual must be living in Ireland in order to
apply for a PPSN. PPSNs provide a good indication of the short-term
trends in migration into Ireland from the EU10. It is important to note that
PPSNs record the monthly gross inflows of migrants from the Accession
States who are predominantly looking for employment and not the increase
in the stock of migrants. The number of PPSNs issued is likely to overstate
the stock of Accession State nationals as they will also include those EU10
migrants who work in Ireland for only a short period of time and return
home.
Figure 5.10 shows that the level of PPSNs issued to EU10 nationals has in-
creased dramatically over the past five years. In the years 2001-2003 be-
tween 9,000 and 11,000 PPSNs were issued annually. In 2004 this figure
increased more than five times to 59,000. Almost 54,000 of these were is-
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Figure 5.9 Number of Work Permits Issued to Accession State 
Nationals, 2001-2004
Note: 2004 data refers to permits issued from 1st January 31st of April
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey Q4 2005
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Figure 5.10 Personal Public Service Numbers Issued to 
Accession State Nationals 2001-2005
Source: Department of Social and Family Affairs
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sued in the post accession period (May 2004 to December 2004). In 2005
the number of PPSN allocations to EU10 nationals almost doubled to a
phenomenal 112,000. This represents an increase of 830 per cent on the
numbers issued in 2003. In the period after enlargement 186,000 PPSNs
were allocated to nationals of the Accession States in the period up to Feb-
ruary 2006. This compares with a figure of about 35,000 from the 1st of
January 2001 to the 31st of April 2004. Despite this massive increase, less
than 1,000 accession state nationals were signing on the unemployment
register in March 2006 (FÁS, 2006). There is no evidence, therefore that
nationals of the Accession States are coming to Ireland for the purposes of
“welfare tourism“. 
The number of PPSN numbers issued monthly since May 2004 to nation-
als from (a) Poland, (b) the Baltic States, (c) the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, and (d) Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta are shown in Figure
5.11. Although there are significant fluctuations in the monthly figures,
possibly due to seasonal factors, there is a discernible upward trend. This
is most evident from the figures for Poland and to a lesser extent from the
figures for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The upward trend is very
clear from the monthly averages based on six months data for 2004, 12
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Figure 5.11 Personal Public Service Numbers Issued to 
Nationals of the Accession States May 2004 to 
February 2006
Source: Department of Social and Fanily Affairs
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months data for 2005 and three months data for 2006. The average number
of PPSNs issued in these periods was 8,931 in 2004, 9,162 in 2005 and
10,269 in 2006. 
Over 55 per cent of the PPSNs issued to EU10 nationals in the post acces-
sion period were allocated to Polish citizens (see Figure 5.12). The number
of PPSNs issued to Poles increased significantly in the post accession peri-
od from 3,800 in 2003 to 65,000 in 2005. Poland is the largest of the Ac-
cession States, with a population of almost 40 million, and also has one of
the weakest labour markets. Prior to accession Lithuanian and Latvian na-
tionals represented a significant proportion of the PPSNs issued to EU10
citizens. Although their proportions have decreased post-accession their
numbers have increased almost nine-fold; in 2003 2,400 Lithuanians and
1,200 Latvians were allocated PPSNs, by 2005 the numbers had grown to
18,700 and 9,400 respectively.
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Figure 5.12 Percentage of Personal Public Service Numbers 
Issued to Accession State Nationals, by 
Nationality, 2001-2005
Source: Department of Social and Fanily Affairs
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The fact that almost 186,000 PPSNs have been issued since May 2004
does not mean that all of these migrants found a job as the PPSN number
is also required for other purposes such as access to State services. How-
ever, cross matching of PPSN numbers with income tax records indicates
that around 70 per cent of those with a PPSN number subsequently took
up employment. 
Table 5.1 shows that although Polish nationals are the largest group to re-
ceive PPSNs, it is the Lithuanians and Latvians who have the greatest
propensity to enter the Irish labour market. These countries are experienc-
ing poor economic conditions with low GDP per head and high unemploy-
ment rates. It is not surprising therefore that the propensity of their citizens
to migrate to Ireland is relatively higher. The correlation between propensi-
ty to migrate and GDP per capita of country of origin is 0.66 and it is sig-
nificant at the 5 per cent level. The correlation between the propensity to
migrate and the unemployment rate is not significant. 
5.4 Average Hourly Earnings of Employees in Ireland
The earnings data for Ireland do not distinguish between earnings of Irish
and foreign workers. Nevertheless, it is worth looking at earnings growth
before and after enlargement in the context of the data on employment of
accession state nationals in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 to see if there is any rela-
tionship between employment of nationals from the Accession States and
earnings growth. The data in Figure 5.13 on hourly earnings of employees
in Ireland indicate a decrease in earnings growth rates at the aggregate lev-
el and for eight of the ten sectors for which data are available. In the five
quarters prior to accession the average hourly earnings of employees grew
by 8.8 per cent whereas in the five quarters post-accession they grew by
5.7 per cent. While it is not possible to say to what extent the slow down
in earnings growth was influenced by the inflow of workers from the Ac-
cession States, economic theory suggests that an increase in the supply of
workers should exert downward pressure on earnings growth. However, a
decrease in earnings growth of the magnitude recorded between the pre-
and post-accession periods is well within historical experience and it may
have been influenced by other factors as well as immigration. Further re-
search is needed to try and identify the effects of immigration and other
factors, such as continuing strong labour demand, on the slow-down in
earnings growth between the pre- and post-accession periods.
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Table 5.1 PPSNs Issued May 2004 to February 2006 as a 
Proportion of Country of Origin Population
Country of Origin
PPSN issued 
to nationals as 
percentage of home 
country population 
in 2004
GDP per head in 
country of origin 
(Euros per inhabitant 
at 1995 exchange 
rates and prices)
Unemployment rate in 
country of origin 2004
Lithuania 0.959 2,500 11.4
Latvia 0.717 3,100 10.4
Slovakia 0.287 4,200 18.2
Estonia 0.286 4,000 9.7
Poland 0.270 4,200 19.0
Czech Republic 0.080 5,200 8.3
Hungary 0.052 5,000 6.1
Slovenia 0.008 11,400 6.3
Source: Department of Social and Family Affairs, Eurostat.
Some support for the view that factors other than immigration were at work
is provided by the behaviour of earnings growth in two of the sectors in
which the largest percentage increases in employment of accession state
nationals occurred. In construction, employment of accession state nationals
increased by two and a half times from 6,000 in Q4 2004 to 15,200 in Q4
2005 while in wholesale and retailing employment of accession state na-
tionals doubled from 4,000 to 8,000. In the five quarters before and after
accession earnings in construction grew from 6.7 per cent to 8.2 per cent,
while in wholesale and retailing they increased from 3.9 per cent to 5.4 per
cent. It should also be noted that the ranking of these two sectors in terms
of earnings remained unchanged after enlargement. In construction average
hourly earnings in March 2004 amounted to €16.70 and to €18.61 in Sep-
tember 2005 while in wholesaling and retailing they increased from €15.95
to €16.86.
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Figure 5.13 Average Hourly Earnings Growth by Sector, 
Average of Five Quarters Pre and Post Accession
Source: ESRI earnings series created from CSO earnings publication
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6 IMMIGRATION AND JOB DISPLACEMENT
IN IRELAND
The inflows of immigrants from the EU10 Member States in the post-
accession period have been much larger than expected mainly because of
continuing strong labour demand and possibly because of re-direction of
migration from countries which imposed transitional rules on access to their
labour markets. The scale of the inflows has put increased pressure in Ire-
land on the price of renting and buying accommodation, on transport and
other infrastructure. In addition there have been a number of developments
that have resulted in some concern that Irish workers in certain sectors are
being displaced by foreign workers who are being paid less than the collec-
tively agreed rates of pay. These issues were first brought to national promi-
nence by the Gama and Irish Ferries cases (see boxes). A number of exam-
ples similar to the Gama case have subsequently been cited by different
trade unions as evidence of foreign companies employing their nationals at
lower than the legally recognised rates of pay for the job21.
These cases were regarded by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU)
as breaching the terms of the social partnership arrangement between the
trade unions, the employers and the Government. The last national agree-
ment expired at the end of 2005 and the government issued an invitation to
the social partners to participate in a new agreement in October 2005. The
ICTU deferred accepting this invitation pending clarification from the gov-
ernment that issues relating to employment standards, displacement, in-
spection and enforcement would be discussed before negotiations on rates
of pay under a new national agreement. The Irish Ferries and Gama cases
were cited by the trade unions as examples of the failure of the regulatory
regime to respond effectively to the exploitation of foreign workers and
displacement of Irish workers in the pursuit of greater profits by the busi-
ness community. 
The leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Pat Rabbitte, raised the displacement
question and its implications for the free movement of labour in an inter-
view he gave to the Irish Times on the 3rd of January 2006 when he said:
…displacement is going on in the meat factories and it is going on in the hospi-
tality industry and it is going on in the building industry. 
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21 These examples include claims of Polish workers being underpaid at the Electricity Supply
Board power station at Moneypoint, Hungarian workers being underpaid at the Spencer
Dock construction site, and Serbian workers being underpaid by a Belgrade based sub-
contractor involved in the renewal of the electricity network. All of these claims have been
contested by the main contractors responsible for the projects.
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The time may be coming when we will have to sit down and examine whether
we would have to look at whether a works permit regime ought to be imple-
mented in terms of some of this non-national labour, even for countries in the
EU. We didn’t require any such regime at the time of accession. The time may
be coming when we have to examine it because we need to know more about
what is going on.
What Irish Ferries has done has lanced the boil and we need to know more
about the numbers coming here, the kind of work they are engaged in, the dis-
placement effect, if any, on other sectors. We need to look at that because there
is anecdotal evidence about it happening in meat factories and happening in the
hospitality industry.
These remarks were criticised by the Government parties but welcomed by
the trade unions. The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment said
the Government had no plans to review its decision to allow workers from
On 8 February 2005 the Socialist T.D. Mr. Joe Higgins alleged in the Irish Parliament that 
Gama Construction Ireland, which employed approximately 2,000 construction workers 
on public works projects, paid its unskilled workers between €2 and €3 per hour and its 
skilled workers somewhere over €3 per hour. Gama Construction Ireland operates under 
the umbrella of Gama International B.V. (established in the Netherlands in 2003) and 
Gama Group, the parent company in Turkey.
Mr. Higgins pointed out that the minimum wage is €7 per hour and that the registered 
employment agreement for the lowest paid operative in construction is €12.96 per hour. 
The Taoiseach (Prime Minister) said that the matter would be investigated by the labour 
inspectorate of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment.
On 23 March 2005 Mr. Higgins said that Gama had paid up to €40 million into bank ac-
counts in Finansbank in Amsterdam in the names of their Turkish employees’. He said the 
money was probably the difference between what the employees were paid in Turkey and 
the agreed trade union rate in Ireland. While the Turkish workers had signed documents 
authorising the creation of these bank accounts they said the form they signed was in 
English, which they did not understand, and that they learned of the existence of the bank 
accounts only after the investigation into the company began.
Gama Construction Ireland rejected the allegation about underpayment of its Turkish 
workers. It said that its Turkish employees received some of their wages in Ireland subject 
to Irish taxation, a portion in Turkey subject to Turkish taxation and that a portion was 
paid into a Dutch bank on a remittance basis of taxation allowed by the Irish government. 
Under the remittance basis earnings paid to foreign nationals working in Ireland were 
only liable for tax on the portion of earnings required for living expenses in Ireland. The 
taxation of earnings on a remittance basis is no longer allowed in Ireland.
The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment said in a statement on 12 April 
2005 that he had received the report of the Labour Inspectorate into alleged breaches of 
Employment Rights but was prevented from publishing it following proceedings initiated 
in the courts by Gama. Although the report was never published a report in the Examiner 
newspaper in April 2005 indicated that it had failed to clear the company.
Box 6.1 The Gama Case
the EU10 states free access to the labour market without requiring a work
permit.
The only statistical data which have been used to support the argument
about displacement were cited in an article in the Irish Times on 13 Janu-
ary 2006 by the Head of Research at SIPTU, the country’s largest trade
union (see O’Riordan 2006). He used earnings and employment data for
the manufacturing sector to argue that “unregulated immigration and un-
scrupulous hiring practices are undermining wages and conditions”. His
evidence shows that earnings growth fell in the manufacturing sector from
4.7 per cent in the year ending March 2005 to 2.1 per cent in the year end-
ing September 2005 and that the level of hourly earnings fell in some sub-
sectors such as food products, office machinery and computers, and elec-
trical machinery. He supported his case with data on employment in the
manufacturing sector which show that the number of foreign workers in-
creased by 8,000 while the number of Irish workers decreased by 19,400
between September 2004 and September 2005.
This evidence is circumstantial. It infers that earnings growth fell in manu-
facturing because foreign workers took lower wages in some sub-sectors
and displaced Irish workers. However, the decrease in earnings growth in
manufacturing could be due to other factors such as seasonal changes in
67
Box 6.2 The Irish Ferries Case
In September 2005 the management of a company operating services between Ireland, the 
UK and France, Irish Ferries, announced that it planned to offer redundancy terms to 543 
seafarers and to replace them with agency workers, mainly from Latvia, who would be 
paid €3.60 an hour, less than half the minimum wage. The company planned to re-register 
its vessels in Cyprus and justifi ed its action on the grounds that most of its competitors 
were using hired-in agency crews rather than directly employed seafarers.
The government condemned the company’s action but said it could not prevent it re-re-
gistering in Cyprus to avoid Ireland’s employment laws. Many of the seafarers accepted 
the redundancy offer but some members of the trade union SIPTU reacted in November 
by occupying one of the company’s ships while it was docked in Wales. There was con-
siderable public support in Ireland, the UK and France for the seafarers. It culminated 
in December 2005 in the biggest national demonstration seen in Ireland in almost thirty 
years. In addition to supporting the seafarers many of those participating in the demon-
stration demanded that foreign nationals employed in Ireland should be paid the collecti-
vely agreed rate of pay for the job. Irish Ferries eventually entered into negotiations with 
SIPTU. A compromise settlement was reached under which the company could proceed 
with its plan to re-register its vessels in Cyprus but agreed to pay its agency workers the 
minimum wage €7.65 per hour.
The European Trade Union Confederation believes that the core issues raised by the Irish 
Ferries case are similar to the Vaxholm case in Sweden.
employment. A comprehensive earnings series developed in the ESRI (see
Doyle 2005) shows that in other production industries (which is compara-
ble to manufacturing) a similar trend to the one identified by O’Riordan
was observed between March 2002 and September 2002 and March 2003
and September 2003 before the increase in immigration from the Acces-
sion States, as Figure 6.1 shows. 
The QNHS employment data for the period Q4 2004 to Q4 2005 indicate
that the number of migrants in other production industries and in hotels
and restaurants has increased while the number of Irish workers in these
sectors has decreased. In the remaining sectors employment of Irish and
foreign workers have both increased. The earnings data show that there has
been no decline in the aggregate level of earnings since enlargement in ei-
ther the industrial or hotels and restaurants sectors or indeed in any of the
remaining sectors. The substitution of migrant workers for Irish workers in
some sectors is the kind of labour turnover one would expect as Irish
workers take advantage of a growing labour market to move into higher
paying jobs and migrants fill the resulting vacancies.
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Figure 6.1 Earnings Growth Rates year end Q1 1999 to Q3 
2005
Source: Doyle (2006)
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If there was displacement on a significant scale, one would expect to see
some evidence of it in falling vacancies and rising unemployment. At the
beginning of the enlargement in May 2004 the percentage of firms in all
sectors reporting vacancies was 10.6 per cent, in May 2005 the figure was
the same and by February 2006 it had risen to 16.7 per cent. In the manu-
facturing sector 18.9 per cent of firms reported vacancies in May 2004,
21.4 per cent reported vacancies in May 2005 and 22.2 per cent reported
vacancies in February 2006. The vacancies data suggest that the demand
for labour remained strong after enlargement and they provide no evidence
of a substantial reduction in the number of jobs available in the economy. 
Similarly there is no evidence from the unemployment data that displace-
ment of Irish workers has resulted in an increase in the unemployment
rate. In an article in the Irish Times on 14 January 2006 addressing the
displacement issue, Garret FitzGerald noted that since the Irish labour
market was opened to CEE nationals the unemployment rate had actually
fallen up to December 2005. As he points out:
…if there has been significant displacement of Irish workers by immigrants in
some sectors, the unemployment data suggest they must have been re-employed
elsewhere. And, in so far as there is a difference between Irish and immigrant
workers, part at least of this phenomenon could be accounted for by Irish work-
ers moving to better-paid jobs, and being replaced by lower-paid immigrants in
their old positions.
The statistical data that have been used to address the displacement issue
are capable of different interpretations and further research is needed to
disentangle the different arguments. On the evidence available to date, dis-
placement does not appear to be a source of disturbance in the labour mar-
ket. However, the cases that have occurred of replacement of Irish workers
by workers from within the EU earning lower rates of pay indicate that the
problem has the potential to become a bigger issue unless it is dealt with
by such measures as providing information in Central and Eastern Euro-
pean languages on workers rights, co-ordinated campaigns by the social
partners to extend collective agreements to foreign enterprises bringing in
their own workers, and strengthening the labour inspectorate to implement
existing legislation on pay and conditions of employment.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
In December 2003 the Accession Treaty was signed by the existing mem-
ber states of the European Union and the ten Accession States (EU10). It
was therefore agreed that ten new Member States would join the European
Union on the 1st of May 2004. The Treaty provided for transitional arrange-
ments whereby countries could restrict access to their labour markets for a
period of up to seven years. Fears of mass immigration and welfare
tourism fuelled enlargement debates across Europe which resulted in only
three countries, Ireland, Sweden and the UK, opening their labour markets
to citizens from the Accession States from the 1st of May 2004. However,
both Ireland and the UK restricted social welfare access to Accession State
nationals for up to two years. It is now two years since ten countries be-
came members of the European Union. Our paper has evaluated develop-
ments in Ireland and Sweden and Gilpin et al. (2005) have assessed the
impacts on the UK labour market. 
Two years is a very short period for following up what has happened and
in practice the period is even shorter. In the Swedish case for some types
of data we only have information for 2004 and 2005 (but not for any part
of 2006), i.e. for one year and eight months. For other types of data we
have information for only 2004, i.e. for only eight months after the acces-
sion, and for the labour market outcome the information covers an even
shorter part of the enlargement period. In the Irish case, we have labour
market data for accession state nationals only for the period Q4 2004 to
Q4 2005 following enlargement so that it is not possible to make compar-
isons of their labour market position before and after enlargement. As it
takes time to react to new circumstances, like new rules regarding migra-
tion, we cannot expect the full effect of the change to have taken place in
only a few months or even in two years. However, we believe that informa-
tion for this short period may contribute to better knowledge of the likely
effects of the deregulation of migration from the Accession States. 
Economic theory proposes income as an important factor influencing mi-
gration. People tend to migrate from countries with low-income levels to
countries with high-income levels. At the time of enlargement the average
GDP per capita of the Accession States was only a quarter that of the ex-
isting EU15. Therefore, as anticipated the migratory flows in both the pre-
and post-enlargement periods have been from the poorer Accession coun-
tries to the richer existing member states. The flows from the Accession
States to Sweden, Ireland and the UK did increase in the post enlargement
period. Migration from the Accession States to Sweden was twice as large
in 2005 as it was in 2003: 2,818 in 2003 compared with 1,455 in 2005.
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The immigrants were predominantly male and came mainly from the
Poland and the three Baltic States. Consequently the number of residence
permits granted for citizens of the ten Accession States also increased. In
the first year after enlargement, the gross inflow of immigrants to Ireland
reached its highest level recorded (53,400), since annual estimates began in
1987. Almost forty per cent of these immigrants came from the accession
states, with approximately twenty per cent from Poland and ten per cent
from Lithuania. Although the majority of the immigrants were Polish, Lat-
vians and Lithuanians have the highest propensity to migrate to Ireland.
Relative to their populations Lithuanians, for example, are more than three
times likely to migrate to Ireland as Poles. The propensity of nationals of
the Accession States to migrate to Ireland is inversely related to GDP per
head in the country of origin.
Higher incomes alone are not a sufficient pull factor for migration, as
people generally will not migrate if there are no available jobs. Therefore the
labour market situations in the home and host countries are also important
factors influencing a person’s decision to migrate. At the time of enlarge-
ment unemployment levels in the Accession States were relatively high
compared with Sweden, Ireland and the UK. The Irish labour market was in
a very strong position at the time of enlargement. Employment growth in
2003 was 2.8 per cent and the unemployment rate was 4.5 per cent. In the
year prior to enlargement 45,700 work permits were issued in Ireland with
over half given to Accession State nationals. The Irish Government were
hoping that in the post-accession period 70 to 80 per cent of these jobs
could be sourced from the Accession States. In the post enlargement period
Accession State nationals accounted for over half of the jobs created in the
Irish economy and the employment of EU10 nationals tripled. In the third
quarter of 2004 19,500 EU10 nationals were employed in Ireland. This fig-
ure reached 61,600 in final quarter of 2005. The strength and flexibility of
the Irish labour market appears to have been the main factor explaining why
the migratory inflows were much greater than expected. 
Unemployment in Sweden both at the time of enlargement and in the post-
enlargement period was relatively low compared to the rest of the EU.
However, the labour market was not in as strong a position as the Irish
labour market. This could partly explain the lower migratory flows to Swe-
den despite its closer proximity to the Accession States. However, the Eng-
lish language is also mentioned in the literature as a pull factor for highly
educated migrants. Migration from the Accession States to Sweden was
lower than had been projected. It is difficult to discuss the labour market
status of the migrants as the labour market statistics in Sweden have a pro-
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duction lag. The information available is for 2003 and 2004 and indicates
that EU10 workers work shorter hours, have lower full-time monthly wages
than Swedish nationals and also their employment rate is lower than that of
Swedish nationals. This contrasts with the experience of Ireland where the
participation rate of EU10 nationals is 90 per cent, compared with 62 per
cent for Irish nationals. The countries also differ in relation to the concen-
tration of EU10 workers across sectors. In Ireland there is a concentration
of workers from the Accession States in the construction, manufacturing
and hospitality sectors. This contrasts with the position in Sweden where,
apart from the health sector in which they are overrepresented and the
construction and public administration sectors in which they are under-
represented, they are distributed across sectors in similar proportions to
Swedish workers. However, in both Ireland and Sweden, nationals of the
EU10 states represent a relatively small minority of workers even in the
sectors in which they are concentrated.
In relation to the ‘welfare tourism’ debate there is no evidence from Swe-
den or Ireland that Accession State nationals are in any way over-repre-
sented in the welfare state schemes. In relation to Ireland, the evidence
suggests that displacement of Irish workers by lower paid immigrants is
not a source of disturbance in the labour market. To the extent that there
has been displacement in some sectors it could be accounted for, at least in
part, by the normal dynamics of the labour market in which Irish workers
move to better-paid jobs and are replaced by lower-paid immigrants. 
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APPENDIX 1  THE PRE-ENLARGEMENT DEBATE
 IN SWEDEN
Jonas Eriksson
A.1.1 General Attitudes to Enlargement
Sweden became the only country among the EU15 Member States to have 
Community rules for all citizens of the European Union after 1 May 2004. 
However, it long looked as if Sweden would also impose restrictions to the 
freedom of movement for workers from the new Member States and there 
were even accusations voiced by those who opposed transitional rules that 
the Swedish u-turn had been the reason things were set in motion in Ireland 
and the UK. We therefore ﬁnd it interesting to provide a more thorough 
survey of the Swedish debate.
The debate in Sweden on immigration after 1 May 2004 picked up speed 
in late November 2003, ﬁve months before the enlargement. The process 
of enlarging the Union with ten new members had long had strong sup-
port from both the political parties and a majority of the public (see, for 
example, Eurobarometer 2002-2004; and SIFO 2004a and 2004b) and the 
position of the Social Democratic Government was until November 2003 
that there would be no need for restrictions to the free movement of workers 
from the EU10 countries. Earlier warnings from three labour unions and 
the recommendations of a Government report from 2002 (SOU 2002:116), 
which had warned of unscrupulous employers who would exploit workers 
from EU10 and take advantage of the Swedish social security system in or-
der to keep wages at a minimum, had been rejected by the Swedish Prime 
Minister, Göran Persson.
However, on 21 November 2003, Göran Persson for the ﬁrst time publicly 
expressed concern that the Swedish social security system would come un-
der strain as people from the new Member States would immigrate to Swe-
den and abuse the Swedish welfare system (see, for example, Tidningarnas 
Telegrambyrå 2003b). This sparked the debate in Sweden and the percei-
ved consequences of the Eastern enlargement on immigration and “beneﬁt 
tourism” would dominate the enlargement debate until May 2004.
A.1.2 Swedish Government Reports
The potential effects of the 2004 EU enlargement were examined in a series 
of Government reports in 1997.1 Regarding the free movement of labour, 
which was covered in the fourth chapter in the Government report SOU
1 The reports covered aspects such as security (SOU 1997:143); environment (SOU 
1997:149); agriculture (SOU 1997:150); and the public economy (SOU 1997:153).
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1997:153, Per Lundborg, Professor of Economics at the Trade Union Insti-
tute for Research (FIEF), emphasised the need to distinguish between
potential and actual migration. While the former aspect is determined by,
inter alia, real wage differences, unemployment in the sending country and
geographic distance between countries, the latter is to a large extent control-
led by labour demand, i.e. the number of vacancies, in the receiving country.
The report concluded that potential emigration from the EU10 was indeed
considerable, given substantial wage differences and the educational struc-
tures in the EU10 countries,2 but that a number of factors spoke against
high actual emigration. First, the industrial sector, where labour demand
was high in the 1960s and 1970s, has decreased in the world’s richer coun-
tries, including Sweden, and labour demand is therefore substantially lower
today. Second, wages are not flexible in the Swedish labour markets due to
regulations (the collective agreements system). Third, education and lin-
guistics3 have become more important and domestic employers have better
insights into the domestic education system (SOU 1997:153).
The report also identified several channels within which immigration
might still take place. First, the right to actively look for work in richer
countries might lead to significant immigration and hence to extensive
search unemployment. Second, a number of employers are not part of the
above mentioned regulations and these firms may attract foreign workers.
Third, open borders might give rise to extensive immigration of self-em-
ployed persons, who are not part of the collective agreements. Fourth, the
potential for major immigration flows is greater in labour market segments
with freer wage structures. The report therefore pointed to the possibility
of negative consequences as a result of immigration, especially if unions
were to demand increased regulation, which in turn would imply higher
equilibrium unemployment (SOU 1997:153).4
In 2002 a new Government report, SOU 2002:116 (henceforth the Rollén
report), examined likely disturbances in the Swedish labour market after
enlargement. The Rollén report concluded that immigration would
probably be low and disturbances therefore minor, despite open borders,
2 Emigration is more common among highly-educated and among people with low education;
see SOU 1997:153.
3 In countries such as Sweden, where few outside the country master the language, immigra-
tion is likely to be lower, ceteris paribus, than in English and German speaking countries.
4 Transitional rules had not yet become an issue in 1997 and the report did not problemise
this particular aspect. However, FIEF questioned the conclusions of the 2002 Government
report, SOU 2002:116; see Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden (2003) and below. As
will become clear below, the prediction that the unions would demand increased regulation
turned out to be correct.
but that the Swedish welfare system was vulnerable to organised crime and
unscrupulous employers and that this motivated transitional rules.5 The
conclusions in the report were in important aspects based on the interpreta-
tions of a number of rulings in the European Court of Justice, in particular
the Rinner-Kühn (ECJ 1989) and the Kempf (ECJ 1986) cases. These cas-
es, especially the former, would play key roles in the spring 2004 debate
and it might therefore be useful to provide the background.
Mrs Rinner-Kühn had worked for FWW Spezial-Gebaeudereinigung
GmbH, an office-cleaning undertaking, and the company had refused to
continue to pay wages during absence due to illness.6 The German Labour
Court in Oldenburg had therefore referred to the Court for a preliminary
ruling on the interpretation of Article 1197 and of Council Directive
75/117/EEC concerning the principle of equal pay for men and women.
The Court concluded that (ECJ 1989, italics added),
[a]rticle 119 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as precluding national legis-
lation which permits employers to exclude employees whose normal working
hours do not exceed 10 hours a week or 45 hours a month from the continued
payment of wages in the event of illness, if that measure affects a far greater
number of women than men, unless the Member State shows that the legislation
concerned is justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on
grounds of sex.
The second case concerned a German national, Mr Kempf, who had
worked part-time as a music teacher in the Netherlands. As his income was
insufficient to support himself, he applied for and received social al-
lowance in the Netherlands. He had also received social security benefits
under the Dutch Law on Sickness Insurance during a period when he was
unable to work due to illness. When Mr Kempf applied for a residence
permit in 1981, the application was refused on the grounds that Mr Kempf
“had recourse to public funds in the Netherlands and was therefore mani-
festly unable to meet his needs out of the income received from his em-
ployment” (ECJ 1986). However, the Court ruled that (ECJ 1986),
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5 The recommendations were thus based on rather different concerns from those originally in-
tended when the EU15 Member States decided to introduce transitional arrangements on
labour mobility in the Accession Treaty.
6 “The German Law […] provides that an employer must continue to pay wages for a period
of up to six weeks to any employee who, after the commencement of his employment and
through no fault of his own, is incapable of working. However, employees whose contract of
employment provides for a normal period of work of not more than 10 hours a week or 45
hours a month are excluded from the benefit of that provision,” see ECJ (1989).
7 Article 119 (Article 141 in the Treaty of Nice) of the EEC Treaty states that “[e]ach Mem-
ber State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal
work or work of equal value is applied.”
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[w]here a national of a Member State pursues within the territory of another
Member State by way of employment activities which may in themselves be re-
garded as effective and genuine work, the fact that he claims financial assis-
tance payable out of the public funds of the latter Member State in order to sup-
plement the income he receives from those activities does not exclude him from
the provisions of community law relating to freedom of movement for workers.
The Rollén report inferred, on basis of the Court’s rulings, that it was pos-
sible to work for a minimum of ten hours a week and then collect social
allowance in Sweden. This became known as the “ten-hour-rule”.8 The Rol-
lén report argued that the Swedish social security system was easily acces-
sible and that this would act as an incentive for organised crime and un-
scrupulous employers to use social allowances as part of wages paid to
their workers.
On basis of this conclusion the report therefore suggested, among other
things, that Sweden should continue to apply national legislation for 2-7
years vis-à-vis the new Member States,9 but at the same time introduce
measures that would speed up turnaround time for EU10 workers and fa-
cilitate an improvement of matching between applicants from the EU10
and vacancies in the Swedish labour market (SOU 2002:116).
The Rollén report caused some confusion in Sweden.10 Experts on EU law,
at a public hearing before the Committee on Social Insurance in the Riks-
dag on 13 April 2004, questioned the validity of the interpretation of the
Court’s rulings (Riksdagen 2004). They argued that the Rinner-Kühn case
did not concern the definition of what constitutes a “worker” per se, but
the principle of equal pay for equal work, as was also stated by the Court
in its ruling. At the same hearing it was also emphasised that the Court’s
definition of a “worker” is ambiguous and varies according to context.
Furthermore, the definition of a “worker” according to article 39, EC
Treaty, and Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC, on the freedom of move-
ment for workers, does not necessarily coincide with the definition in arti-
8 Interestingly, the European Commission has provided a similar interpretation. A Commission
communication from 2002, in referring to the Rinner-Kühn case, claims that the Court con-
siders a person to be a worker if he or she “works ten hours a week”, see EC (2002, p. 5). 
9 Any employment that would warrant a residence permit in Sweden would, according to the
report, be defined as full-time employment with a normal Swedish income, or, at least, an
income on which the worker in question would be able to support himself during his stay in
Sweden (SOU 2002:116, p. 15).
10 It also caused confusion elsewhere: on the BBC homepage (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/3513889.stm; 10 February 2006) one can read that Sweden “is particularly con-
cerned about exploitation of its generous social security system – which requires work for
only 10 hours to gain access to benefits.” Needless to say, if the Court’s rulings were inter-
preted correctly in the Rollén report, the “ten-hour-rule” would be applicable in all EU25
Member States and not just in Sweden.
cle 42, EC Treaty, and Council Regulation 1408/71/EEC, on social security
in relation to the free movement of workers. The lowest common denomi-
nator for the definition of a worker is rather that a person is carrying out
“genuine and effective work” that is not “purely marginal and ancillary”
(see ECJ 1982).
Several of the political parties were to incorporate the discussion in their
proposals to the Riksdag on 28 April 2004, in some cases requesting the
Government to review EU legislation with the intention to reform Council
Regulation 1408/71/EEC or to gain support in other EU Member States for
making alterations to the “ten-hour-rule” (see proposals 2003/04:Sf39;
2003/04:Sf40; and 2003/04:Sf44). Much energy was thus put into dis-
cussing a non-existent rule, despite the fact that it may well be possible for
a person from another EU Member State to work for less than ten hours a
week and still be seen as a worker in the eyes of the Court.
A majority of Swedish Government agencies, labour unions, employers’
organisations, municipalities and regional authorities, rejected the propos-
als when commenting on the Rollén report (see Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs of Sweden 2003). The most common counterargument concerned the
current and future need for workers in the Swedish labour market, since re-
strictions would hamper the process of filling vacancies. Several commen-
tators believed the proposals would have a limited or no effect on infringe-
ments, whilst instead causing unnecessary and costly bureaucracy.11
A third counterargument often cited concerned the demographic situation
in the new Member States. The fact that several of the EU10 countries face
even worse dependency ratio problems than Sweden implies that immigra-
tion would remain low. Fourth, and related to the first point, several com-
mentators called attention to the potential economic gains from the free
movement of workers and argued that an increased labour mobility would
be good for both economic growth and a future EMU membership.12
Other reasons for rejecting the proposals were that they were seen as a dis-
proportionate response to a minor problem; that it would be discrimination
on basis of nationality and an unfortunate singling out of nationals from
eight specific nations as “cheaters”; that the Rollén report had based its
conclusions on speculations not supported by evidence concerning the risk
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11 A better solution would according to this line of reasoning be to combat problems where
they appeared, although the preferred solutions differed. A related argument was provided
by the Trade Union Institute for Research, who wanted to know why the abuses the Rollén
report warned for would suddenly be acceptable after two years; see Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Sweden (2003).
12 When the report was presented the EMU referendum in Sweden had not yet taken place.
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of abuse of the social security system; and that the proposals would mean
that Sweden went back on its word, originally having pledged to open its
labour market (Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Sweden 2003).
The commentators who supported the proposals generally did so either by
recommending a precautionary approach, according to which borders
would be opened only after the enlargement effects were known, or by
simply agreeing with the report’s conclusions that the social security sys-
tem was in jeopardy. Only one of the commentators, the Swedish Federa-
tion of Painting Contractors, referred to the fact that a majority of the
EU15 Member States had already decided to impose restrictions and
voiced fears that immigration would increase and thus aggravate the prob-
lems foreseen in the Rollén report.
Two additional aspects deserve mentioning. First, several commentators,
among them the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), foresaw a
growing problem with the number of self-employed from other EU Mem-
ber States, as they are not (necessarily) covered by the collective agree-
ments. Second, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency warned in their com-
ment that parents- and child allowances might be exported to the EU10
countries (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden 2003). This argument
would play a role in the Liberal Party’s proposal for transitional rules be-
fore the Riksdag in April 2004 (see discussion below) and it also gave rise
to a report by the Social Insurance Agency in 2005, commissioned by the
Swedish Government, which examined the extent of the problem after en-
largement (see discussion in the main text above).
A.1.3 The Swedish Media
On 11 November 2003, a documentary that was based on the conclusions
in the Rollén report was broadcast on Swedish national television (SVT
2003). The viewers learned, for example, that an Estonian woman who
worked as a nurse for a minimum of ten hours per week could bring her
husband, children and even her own and her husband’s parents to Sweden,
who would then be eligible for support from the Swedish social security
system. On basis of the calculations in the Rollén report,13 the reporter
13 These calculations, which were carried out by Professor Jan Ekberg at Växjö University, were
also reported on in the Swedish press (see, for example, Svenska Dagbladet 2004). Professor
Ekberg – who has emphasised the importance of quickly integrating immigrants into the
labour market upon arrival if they are to be successfully integrated into society and earn their
own living (see, for example, Dagens Nyheter 2004g) – believed that the EU legislation was
too liberal in so far as it was too easy to access benefits in other EU Member States. How-
ever, his view concerned the Union as a whole, rather than the EU enlargement specifically.
concluded that supporting this family would cost society approximately
38,000 (340,000 Swedish kronor) each year and that the Eastern enlarge-
ment therefore might become a burden on the Swedish budget.
According to one theory (see Dagens Nyheter 2004a), based on interviews
with decision makers, union representatives and civil servants, the SVT
documentary took the political establishment by surprise and explains to a
great extent the Government’s u-turn on transitional rules. That having
been said, as late as on 20 November 2003, nine days after the SVT docu-
mentary14 and the day before changing his position, Göran Persson re-
sponded to concerns expressed by three labour unions (the Transport
Workers’ Union, the Building Workers’ Union and SEKO Seafarers) on
wage dumping and said there would be no need for transitional arrange-
ments (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå 2003a).
The Swedish press was generally more to the point and liberal towards the
principle of free movement of workers from the EU10 countries than the
SVT documentary. A survey of the largest Swedish newspapers15 from No-
vember 2003 to May 2004 shows that they chose to focus much of their at-
tention on the Prime Minister’s statements and sudden change of position,
as the Government originally had pledged to let workers from the new
members compete on an equal footing with workers from the rest of EU15
Member States16 in the Swedish labour market.
Articles in general and editorials in particular either covered aspects that
contradicted the “benefit tourism” hypothesis or were critical of the Gov-
ernment’s u-turn.17 To name but a few examples of the reporting in the
Swedish press, Göteborgs-Posten, in an article on 28 March 2004, attempt-
ed to look beyond the stereotypes and prejudices attached to the Roma
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14 A repeat of the documentary was broadcast on 14 November 2003.
15 The papers surveyed include, Aftonbladet; Borås Tidning; Dagens Industri; Dagens Nyheter;
Dalarnas Tidningar; Expressen; Göteborgs-Posten; Hallandsposten; Helsingborgs Dagblad;
Nerikes Allehanda; Norrtälje Tidning; Nya Dagen; Nya Wermlands-Tidningen; Skånska
Dagbladet; Svenska Dagbladet; Sydsvenska Dagbladet; Sydsvenskan; Upsala Nya Tidning;
Västerbottens-Kuriren; and Östgöta Correspondenten. They are the largest national and
regional papers according to Swedish Newspapers’ Publishers Association; see
http://www.tu.se/. Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, the largest Swedish news agency, and
Smålands-posten, were also included in the survey.
16 With the exception of Danish and Finnish citizens who, under the Agreement on Common
Nordic Labour Market, need no residence permits. The agreement also includes Norwegian
and Icelandic citizens; see Nordic Council (1982).
17 Examples of headlines from the two biggest Swedish tabloids, Aftonbladet and Expressen,
include “Persson på fel spår” (“Persson on the wrong track”, editorial in Aftonbladet on 25
November 2003); and “Lugn, Persson – de vill inte flytta hit” (“Keep calm, Persson – they
don’t want to move”, in Expressen on 28 April 2004).
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population in Slovakia (a much debated issue in several UK tabloids in
early 2004) and Dagens Nyheter, on 25 April 2004, published an article on
the same theme (Dagens Nyheter 2004f). Furthermore, the editorials in
several of the major newspapers in Sweden (see Aftonbladet, 2004a; Da-
gens Nyheter, 2004c; Göteborgs-Posten, 2004; and Norrtälje Tidning,
2004), on 5 February 2004, all argued against imposing restrictions. The
Government’s u-turn was described as “tragic” (Smålandsposten 2004) and
the Liberal Party’s newly adopted position (see below) as “xenophobic”
(Dagens Nyheter 2004c).
One reason for the opposition to transitional rules in the Swedish media
might be that the governing Social Democratic Party adopted a tougher po-
sition than the remaining parties in the Riksdag. As scrutinising the Gov-
ernment is among the more important functions of the media, this implies
a critical stance towards whatever the Government says or does. Another
hypothesis would be that there is an overrepresentation of liberal newspa-
pers in the country, but at the same time left wing newspapers, such as
Aftonbladet, were decidedly against restrictions. A third explanation might
of course be that the Government’s u-turn was an error of judgement that
alienated it from the mainstream view on labour immigration in Sweden.
Regardless of the reasons for the reactions in the media, it seems in retro-
spect somewhat ironic that a documentary on the public service television
helped trigger the debate on “benefit tourism”.
A.1.4 Swedish Unions and Employers’ Organisations
The LO decided in February 2004 that they would support free movement
of workers from the EU10 countries after enlargement.18 The largest affili-
ates, among them the Municipal Workers’ Union and the Metalworkers’
Union, which together organise more than a million workers, were in ac-
cord with this decision (LO 2004a),19 while five of the fifteen affiliates,
the Swedish Building Workers’ Union, the Transport Workers’ Union, the
Swedish Electricians’ Union, the Swedish Painters’ Union and SEKO Sea-
18 This decision was practically taken already in June 2003, when the LO commented on the
circulation of the Rollén report; see Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden (2003). Howev-
er, the LO did support transitional rules in the areas of roads and shipping (see;
http://www.lo.se/home/lo/home.nsf/unidView/9F8C9235EB68563EC1256F6200520F5D, 20
February 2006). Adding confusion to the discussion, in an article on 13 January 2004, two
economists at the LO, Dan Andersson (Chief Economist) and Kristina Mårtensson, ques-
tioned the freedom and solidarity of the free movement of workers if it meant lower wages
for low-income earners and slave-like working conditions and explicitly referred to union
support for transitional rules (Dagens Nyheter 2004d).
19 However, the Municipal Workers’ Union did “accept” the proposals contained in the Rollén
report when commenting on it in 2003; see Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden (2003).
farers, which together organise close to 250,000 members, supported tran-
sitional rules (Byggnads 2003).
In February 2004 the Swedish Building Workers’ Union started a campaign
with advertisements in the press and large posters displayed in the Stock-
holm subway system. The campaign attracted much attention due to its
choice of illustration (semi-naked men in recumbent positions, wearing
only trousers and protective helmets). The key words in the campaign were
“orderliness in the labour market”,20 a phrase that was to be used exten-
sively in the months that followed. The aim of the campaign was allegedly
to call attention to problems with slave wages, “black” workers, jerry-
building and tensions due to stress in the construction sector. Even though
it was not spelled out, the edge was clearly pointed at the coming EU en-
largement, as the campaign warned for low wages and the consequences of
illegal labour immigration two months before the Eastern enlargement (see
Byggnads 2004).
At the same time the LO requested a number of concessions, under the
same parole of “orderliness in the labour market”, partly to prepare for en-
largement by making transitional rules superfluous. The LO wanted
amongst other things to see that main contractors were made responsible
for sub contractors’ taxes; that flexible staffing companies were made sub-
ject to authorisation; that standards regarding preliminary tax paid by self-
employed persons were strengthened; and that unions were given increased
control and monitoring capabilities with regard to the observance of the
collective agreements.21 As has become abundantly clear after the enlarge-
ment, the real concern of the LO prior to 1 May 2004 was not the free
movement of workers, but the free movement of self-employed and, to an
even greater extent, the free movement of services.22
The two main trade union confederations in Sweden for white-collar work-
ers, the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO), with
around 1.3 million members, and the Swedish Confederation of Profes-
sional Associations (SACO), with around 500,000 members, came out
even more strongly against transitional rules. In a common article pub-
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20 The Swedish phrase is “ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden”.
21 A web page has been devoted to this campaign, available at http://www.ordningochreda.se/.
The LO’s request was met by the Green Party, which tabled a motion in March 2004 which
contained the LO’s proposals (see ML 2003/04:mp022). The Social Democrats, the Greens
and the Left Party all incorporated this into their proposals, which meant that LO’s demands
gained a majority in the chamber in April 2004; see Riksdagen 2004b.
22 The Accession Treaty does not allow for transitional arrangements regarding the free move-
ment of services, even though Austria and Germany negotiated concessions in the services
sector.
lished in the Swedish tabloid Expressen, on 25 March 2003, TCO, SACO 
and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, an employer’s organisation, 
argued that the proposals in the Rollén report needlessly cast suspicion on 
people in the new Member States; that the low labour mobility in Europe 
suggested that immigration from the EU10 countries would be insigniﬁ-
cant; and that the ageing population in Sweden served as a reason to pro-
mote immigration rather than restricting it (see Expressen 2003).
Furthermore, in an article in Dagens Nyheter on 28 April 2004, the presi-
dents of pro-business interest organisations in Denmark, Finland and Swe-
den, argued that the Danish, Finnish and Swedish Governments’ positions 
on transitional rules were protectionist and that the freedom of movement 
for workers from the EU10 countries would, among other things, boost 
growth and prosperity and improve the dependency ratios in the Nordic 
countries. They also argued that increased mobility would help deepen the 
integration of the Baltic Sea Region and serve as a bridge to the Russian 
market (Dagens Nyheter 2004e).
A.1.5 The Swedish Public
The Swedish public has been among the most supportive of the enlarge-
ment process in the EU15. According to an opinion poll in November 2002, 
58 per cent were in favour of enlargement, 26 per cent were against and 16 
per cent did not know. In April 2004, according to the same institute (DN/
TEMO 2004), 62 per cent were in favour, 26 per cent were against and 12 
per cent did not know.
The picture is less clear regarding the attitude towards transitional rules 
and free labour mobility from the new Member States. According to a Eu-
robarometer survey carried out in January-February 2002, 45 per cent of 
those polled believed that only a limited number of people would move 
to Sweden, while four out of ten polled thought that immigration from the 
EU10 would be signiﬁcant. Close to two thirds in the latter group viewed 
a high immigration as a negative development (Eurobarometer 2002), but 
the majority of respondents overall did not anticipate negative effects from 
free labour movement.
That having been said, opinion polls can produce very different results de-
pending on the question posed to the respondents. Two surveys carried out 
in the spring of 2004 by the institute SIFO present examples of how the 
formulation of questions can cause results that seemingly contradict each 
other. In the ﬁrst survey in February 2004 (SIFO 2004a) the respondents 
were asked whether they thought it was good that EU10 workers could ap-
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ply for jobs in Sweden on an equal footing with workers from the old
Member States. Almost two thirds of those polled agreed, which seems to
confirm the results of the Eurobarometer survey from 2002. In the second
survey, which was carried out in late March the same year (SIFO 2004b),
the interviewees were asked whether they thought imposing restrictions to
the free movement of workers from the new Member States was a good
idea. More than half (54%) agreed that it was a good idea, while a third
disagreed and 13 per cent did not know.23
However, apart from different questions being asked, which may have
prompted different replies, it should be noted that the discrepancy may
also in part be explained by two other factors. First, by the time the second
survey was performed, the Netherlands had decided to impose restrictions
and the British Government had introduced new legislation, which in turn
led some observers in Sweden to warn for a re-direction of immigration.
Second, as time passed the enlargement drew nearer and public conscious-
ness of the coming event and its potential labour market implications may
have become enhanced.
In conclusion, a majority of Swedes were according to a number of opin-
ion polls supportive of the Eastern enlargement prior to 1 May 2004, even
though there were indeed fears of its implications in some segments. The
political parties that tried to cultivate these fears may thus have found that
the soil was fertile to an extent, but not excessively rich.
A.1.6 The Political Parties in the Riksdag
The party political debate in Sweden prior to the Eastern enlargement was
characterised by changing positions and a major split in the Liberal Party,24
on an issue that was expected to receive support across the board. All of
the seven parties in the Riksdag were staunch supporters of the Eastern en-
largement. As noted, there was also confusion with regard to the mentioned
“ten-hour-rule” and the interpretation of EU law. 
23 Women in this sample were slightly more positive than men towards restrictions; 58 per
cent of the women and 50 per cent of the men polled were in favour of transitional rules.
Differences were also visible in different age groups: more than 62 per cent of those in the
group 50-64 were in favour of transitional rules, whilst less than 43 per cent were in favour
in the 15-29 group, although still a majority of 7 percentage points. The same survey also
asked whether they supported enlargement: 50% were in favour, 32% were against and 19%
did not know (SIFO 2004b). The sample size in both surveys was 1,000 respondents.
24 The split in the Liberal Party is illustrated by two things. First, that Liberal Members of the
Riksdag, among them Erik Ullenhag, spokesperson for the party on questions regarding
refugees and integration, submitted their own proposal, in which they opposed restrictions
(see proposal 2003/04:Sf38) and, second, that a majority of the party’s regional districts
reportedly were against restrictions (see Swedish Radio 2004).
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When the Committee on Foreign Affairs discussed the issue of free move-
ment for workers in relation to the ratification of the Accession Treaty in
the Riksdag in November 2003 – after the Government’s u-turn – the Lib-
erals, together with the Greens, the Centre Party and the Christian Democ-
ratic Party, in a joint statement from the Committee on Social Insurance,
dismissed the need for restrictions (CFA 2003 and CSI 2003). In a separate
statement the Moderate Party seemed to concur with this conclusion, al-
though on different grounds,25 while the Left Party in its statement vigor-
ously opposed restrictions of any kind.
However, in the spring of 2004 the Moderates and the Liberals changed
their positions and drafted their own proposals, which differed from each
other in important aspects, for restricting EU10 nationals’ rights after 1
May 2004. Consequently, three different proposals were tabled in which
measures were planned to curb negative effects from EU enlargement.
Moreover, in February 2004 the Christian Democrats seemed to sway in
their opinion on the issue (see Swedish Radio 2004), but by the time the
question had reached the chamber they had decided to reject restrictions.
Proposals before the Riksdag
According to the Government’s proposal, which was the most far-reaching
proposal for transitional rules, national regulation vis-à-vis the EU10 coun-
tries would continue to apply for at least two years, with the possibility of
extending the period to the full seven years. Hence EU10 nationals would
according to the proposal have to apply for work permits from their home
countries. Moreover, a work permit would have required an offer of em-
ployment of a certain length and a wage in accordance with the collective
agreements. The permits would have been limited to one year, during
which a person’s permission to work in the country would have been con-
fined to a certain profession and employer. The Swedish Migration Board
and the Swedish National Tax Board would have been given a widened
competence with regard to control over self employed and their ability to
support themselves (Swedish Government 2004).26
25 In the special statement the Moderates requested clarification as to which alterations to
Swedish law was intended before enlargement. 
26 Furthermore, a number of actors, including the National Labour Marker Board, the Swedish
Migration Board and the unions and employers in the Swedish labour market, would have
been given the task to set up and implement a monitoring system in order to detect any
disturbances in the Swedish labour market after enlargement (Swedish Government 2004).
In other words, this part of the Government’s proposal was in accordance with the LO’s
wish list.
The Liberals’ proposed a shortened transition period of eight months, dur-
ing which workers from the EU10 countries would need a work permit.
Work permits would only be granted if workers could prove that they were
able to support themselves while staying in Sweden. However, unlike in
the Social Democrats’ proposal, they would have been allowed to apply for
work permits in Sweden, rather than from the Swedish embassy in their re-
spective home countries. They also proposed that access to social security
would require something in return, i.e. that applicants could show, for ex-
ample, that they were actively looking for work.
The proposal also recommended that the Government promoted reform of
both the EU’s and Sweden’s legislation concerning housing-, parent- and
child allowances and study grants, according to a “principle of settlement”,
that is to say, that allowances should only be given if a person lives in the
country.27 Lastly, the Liberals proposed that an information campaign be
carried out in the EU10 countries, which would inform about Swedish
labour market regulations and conditions, and that more effort was put into
combating tax evasion (see proposal 2003/04:Sf39).
The Moderates, which is the second largest political party in Sweden, were
opposed to work permits being a necessary qualification before EU10 na-
tionals could get residence permits,28 but proposed instead that all EU citi-
zens, in order to avoid discrimination according to the EC Treaty, would be
denied immediate access to the Swedish social security system and would
have to successively qualify for support (see proposal 2003/04:Sf40).
The remaining four parties in the Riksdag, the Greens, (proposal 2003/
04:Sf41), the Left Party (proposal 2003/04:Sf42), the Centre Party (pro-
posal 2003/04:Sf43) and the Christian Democrats (proposal 2003/04:Sf44),
all shared the view that no transitional rules were needed. The Centre Party
was publicly the strongest advocate of free movement, mainly due to the
strong reaction of the party leader, Maud Olofsson, but the Left Party was
not lagging far behind.
None of the three proposals for restrictions gained majority in the cham-
ber, but it is interesting to note that a majority of Swedish parliamentari-
ans, according to party composition in the Riksdag, supported restrictions
of some kind, albeit in different forms. Widespread speculation also ap-
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27 This was obviously a response to the belief that allowances might be exported to the new
Member States.
28 As a matter of fact, the Moderates’ proposal had the same intention as the legislation intro-
duced by the Labour Government in the UK, even though registration of workers was not
proposed.
peared before the vote as to whether the Social Democratic group in the
Riksdag would choose to vote tactically, supporting proposals in an order
that would have given a proposal for transitional rules majority in the
chamber (see, inter alia, Dagens Nyheter 2004g; and SVT 2004). In the
end they refrained from doing so and Community rules were thus adopted
in Sweden.
90
REFERENCES
Books and articles
European Commission, 2002, Free Movement of Workers – Achieving the
Full Benefits and Potential, Communication from the Commission, COM
(2002) 694 final, Brussels
Traser, J., et al., 2005, Who’s afraid of EU enlargement? Report on the
Free Movement of Workers in EU25, European Citizen Action Service,
September 2005, Brussels
Leading articles, reports and chronicles in the media
Aftonbladet, 2004, “Han är inte ensam – alla blir förlorare” (“He is not
alone – all will be losers”)”, leading article on 6 February 2004
Aftonbladet, 2003, “Persson på fel spår” (“Persson on the wrong track”),
leading article on 25 November 2003
Dagens Nyheter, 2004a, “Tv-inslag fick Persson att byta fot” (“TV-report
made Persson change position”), chronicle by Henrik Brors, 5 March 2004
Dagens Nyheter, 2004b, “Fp måste säga nej till övergångsregler” (“The
Liberal Party must say no to transitional rules”), polemical article by
Bengt Westerberg and Erik Ullenhag, Liberal Party in Sweden, 5 March
2004
Dagens Nyheter, 2004c, “Främlingar i Folkpartiland” (”Strangers in
Liberal Party land”), leading article on 5 March 2004
Dagens Nyheter, 2004d, “LO varnar för arbetskraftsinvandring” (“LO
warns for labour immigration”), polemical article by Dan Andersson and
Kristina Mårtensson, LO, on 13 January 2004
Dagens Nyheter, 2004e, “Destruktivt att agera mot fri rörlighet”
(“Destructive to act against free mobility”), polemical article by Ebba
Lindsö, Director General, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, et al.,
in Dagens Nyheter on 28 April 2004
Dagens Nyheter, 2004f, “Att få göra rätt för sig” (“To be able to do one’s
share”), article by Anna Koblanck, on 25 April 2004
Dagens Nyheter, 2004g, “Politisk miss gör invandrare arbetslösa”
(“Political miss creates unemployment among immigrants”), polemical
article by Professor Jan Ekberg, on 12 March 2004
91
Expressen, 2003, “Låt alla EU-medborgare röra sig fritt” (“Let all EU 
citizens move freely”), polemical article by Anna Ekström, SACO, Sture 
Nordin, TCO and Göran Tunhammar, SN, on 25 March 2003
Expressen, 2004, “Lugn, Persson – de vill inte ﬂytta hit” (“Be calm, Persson 
– they don’t want to move”), leading article on 28 April 2004
Göteborgs-posten, 2004, “Sätt inte polacker i väntrummet” (“Don’t put 
Poles in the waiting room”), leading article on 5 February 2004
Nerikes Allehanda, 2004, “Pinsamt eller mycket pinsamt?” (“Embarrassing 
or very embarrassing?”), leading article on 28 March 2004
Norrtälje Tidning, 2004, “Förolämpa inte de nya EU-länderna” (“Don’t 
insult the new EU countries”), leading article on 5 February 2004
Svenska Dagbladet, 2004, “Generösa regler får kritik - Speciellt 
familjeförmånerna kan fresta till fusk, anser professor” (“Generous rules 
are criticised – Family beneﬁts in particular may tempt people to cheat, 
Professor says”), report by Lena Hennel, on 8 February 2004
Swedish Radio, 2004a, “Kristdemokraterna byter fot i frågan om 
övergångsregler” (“Christian Democrats changes position on the question 
of transitional rules”), interview with the Christian Democratic party leader, 
Göran Hägglund, in a news report by Tomas Ramberg, on 21 February 2004
Swedish Radio, 2004b, “Sprickan inom folkpartiet växer” (“The split in the 
Liberal Party grows”), report by Mari Forsblad on 22 March 2004
Swedish television, 2003, “Oro för östutvidgningen” (“Concern for 
the Eastern enlargement”), by Johan Zachrisson Winberg, in “Uppdrag 
Granskning” on 11 November 2003
Swedish Television, 2004, “Sveriges svek mot Baltikum och Polen” 
(“Sweden’s betrayal of the Baltics and Poland”), debate with Maud 
Olofsson, leader of the Centre Party, Tove Lifvendahl, leader of the Swedish 
Young Conservatives (Moderate Party), and Minister for Employment 
Hans Karlsson, Social Democratic Party, available at http://svt.se/svt/jsp/
Crosslink.jsp?d=6066&a=173738, cited on 3 March 2006
Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 2003a, “Persson dämpar oro för invandring” 
(“Persson tones down concern about immigration”), on 20 November 2003
Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 2003b, “Persson vill ha regler mot “social 
turism” från öst” (“Persson wants rules against “beneﬁt tourism” from the
92
East”), article by Lars Larsson, 21 November 2003
Other Sources
Byggnads, 2003, Underremiss avseende utredningen EU:s utvidgning och 
arbetskraftens rörlighet, SOU 2002:116
Byggnads, 2004, “Ny Ann Nicole i Byggnads tappning”, article by Hans 
Tilly, President of Byggnads, available at http://www.byggnads.se//
kampanj04/debatt_1.htm, cited on 26 February 2006
CFA, 2003, Utrikesutskottets betänkande 2003/04:UU4, Europeiska 
unionens utvidgning 2004, 25 November 2003
Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC, On freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community, 15 October 1968
Council Regulation 1408/71/EEC, On the application of social security 
schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community, 14 June 1971
Eurobarometer, 2002-2004, “STANDARD REPORT” - National reports, 
Sweden, 57-61
European Court of Justice, 2004, Case C-138/02, Collins ECR [2004], 
Judgement of the Court of 13 March 2004: Brian Francis Collins v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Article 39 of the EC Treaty 
European Court of Justice, 1989, Case 171/88, Rinner-Kühn ECR [1989] 
2743, Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. 
KG, Article 119 of the EEC Treaty
European Court of Justice, 1986, Case 139/85 ECR [1986] 1741, R. H. 
Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Article 48 of the EEC Treaty
European Court of Justice, 1982, Case 53/81 ECR [1981], D.M. Levin v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Article 48 of the EEC Treaty
LO, 2004a, “De är inte lösningen på arbetsmarknadens problem”, press 
release from LO on 9 February 2004, available at http://www.lo.se/home/lo/
home.nsf/unidView/F32439D888E97BDBC1256E700035634C, cited on 21 
February 2006
LO 2004b, “LOs krav för ordning och reda på arbetsmarknaden”, press 
information on 9 February 2004, available at http://www.lo.se/home/lo/
home.nsf/unidView/F32439D888E97BDBC1256E700035634C/$ﬁle/
2004%20presseminrium%20EU-utvidgning.doc; cited on 21 February 2004
93
94
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Sweden, 2003, Remissammanställning 
rörande SOU 2002:116, dnr UD2003/147/MAP
Ministry of Social Affairs and Emloyment in the Netherlands, 2004, 
Midden- en Oost Europese werknemers onder voorwaarden toegelaten tot 
de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt, Press Release 04/002, 23 January 2004.
Nordic Council, 1982, Agreement on Common Nordic Labour Market, 
signed on 6 March 1982
Riksdagen, 2004, “Offentlig utfrågning om övergångsregler för arbetstagare 
vid EU:s utvidgning”, Sveriges Riksdag, 13 April 2004
SIFO 2004a, SIFOs Telefonbuss 2004, telephone interviews carried out 
between 11-17 February 2004
SIFO 2004b, SIFOs Telefonbuss 2004, telephone interviews carried out 
between 31 March to 6 April 2004
DN/TEMO, 2004, DN/TEMO om väljaropinionen april 2004, available at 
http://www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=145&a=259239, cited on 10 
February 2006
Swedish Government, 2004, Särskilda regler under en övergångsperiod 
för arbetstagare från nya medlemsstater enligt anslutningsfördraget, Skr. 
2003/04:119
95
Table A.2.1 Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration, 
According to Country of Origin and Destination, 
Sweden, 1987-2005
Year Immigration Emigration Net Migration
1987 42,666 20,673 21,993
1988 51,092 21,461 29,631
1989 65,866 21,484 44,382
1990 60,048 25,196 34,852
1991 49,731 24,745 24,986
1992 45,348 25,726 19,622
1993 61,872 29,874 31,998
1994 83,598 32,661 50,937
1995 45,887 33,984 11,903
1996 39,895 33,884 6,011
1997 44,818 38,543 6,275
1998 49,391 38,518 10,873
1999 49,839 35,705 14,134
2000 58,659 34,091 24,568
2001 60,795 32,141 28,654
2002 64,087 33,009 31,078
2003 63,795 35,023 28,772
2004 62,028 36,586 25,442
2005 65,229 38,118 27,111
Source: Statistics Sweden
APPENDIX 2 TABLES
Table A.2.2 Composition of Immigration According to Country 
of Birth, Sweden, 1987-2005
Year EU10 EU14 Sweden Rest of World
1987 2,048 8,773 5,064 26,781
1988 2,176 10,731 6,215 31,970
1989 2,489 11,855 6,383 45,139
1990 2,687 10,454 6,116 40,791
1991 2,038 7,346 5,089 35,258
1992 2,054 6,348 5,035 31,911
1993 1,661 6,179 5,994 48,038
1994 1,771 7,359 7,577 66,891
1995 1,654 8,138 8,159 27,936
1996 1,399 8,191 8,718 21,587
1997 1,339 7,362 9,546 26,571
1998 1,443 8,613 11,508 27,827
1999 1,542 8,972 13,011 26,314
2000 1,668 10,993 13,664 32,334
2001 1,948 11,881 13,797 33,169
2002 2,388 12,201 13,266 36,232
2003 2,191 11,968 12,588 37,048
2004 4,077 11,668 11,467 34,816
2005 5,354 12,346 11,066 36,463
Notes: EU14 = EU15 minus Sweden. The category EU14 includes citizens of the German 
Democratic Republic. Prior to 1991, immigrants from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were 
citizens of the Soviet Union and prior to 1993 immigrants from the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia were citizens of Czechoslovakia. The peak in 1993-1994 in the Rest of World 
category is explained by an increase in the immigration from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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Table A.2.3 Immigrants and Emigrants According to Country 
of Origin and Destination, Sweden
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Country Im Em Im Em Im Em Im Em Im Em Im Em
Czech Republic
Men 50 50 64 39 86 40 69 48 61 55 106 46
Women 65 24 66 33 65 28 54 29 59 39 89 46
Cyprus
Men 15 31 19 23 25 31 23 22 32 34 21 39
Women 14 31 13 16 34 33 21 32 23 26 19 42
Estonia
Men 98 46 97 36 109 43 88 56 155 69 161 88
Women 218 22 215 17 236 40 223 43 266 56 263 77
Hungary
Men 95 93 96 69 123 71 105 63 113 88 144 91
Women 111 62 110 65 151 69 139 64 154 85 178 90
Latvia
Men 64 21 74 31 63 25 57 33 70 29 98 28
Women 139 10 114 9 126 21 125 25 148 19 151 21
Lithuania
Men 54 14 75 39 85 18 73 22 191 21 356 16
Women 101 10 143 11 176 5 159 16 253 19 353 10
Malta
Men 5 21 13 9 15 32 19 10 12 20 13 17
Women 4 16 6 8 14 17 14 9 14 12 13 14
Poland
Men 309 100 372 117 474 100 470 113 1,163 161 1,815 177
Women 471 99 536 100 712 90 664 103 1,358 138 1,701 173
Slovakia
Men 29 7 29 5 38 15 22 12 43 16 40 18
Women 34 6 29 3 38 6 34 11 76 15 59 12
Slovenia
Men 7 7 7 7 6 11 10 6 23 9 22 11
Women 7 10 17 10 8 13 12 4 18 7 19 10
EU10 1,890 680 2,095 647 2,584 708 2,381 721 4,232 935 5,559 1,053
Men 726 390 846 375 1,024 386 936 385 1,863 512 2,741 551
Women 1,164 290 1,249 272 1,560 322 1,455 336 2,369 423 2,818 502
Note: Im = immigrants, Em = emigrants.
Source: Statistics Sweden.
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Table A.2.5 Employment Rate in September Among Those 
Aged 16-64 According to Country of Origin, 
Living in Sweden at the End of 2003 and 2004
2003 2004
Country Men Women All Men Women All
Czech Republic 55.8 38.6 45.3 60.1 41.3 48.5
Czechoslovakia 64.7 65.1 64.9 64.1 65.8 65.0
Estonia 55.5 53.2 54.0 54.5 53.8 54.0
Hungary 58.5 58.6 58.6 59.0 57.1 58.0
Latvia 44.6 46.3 45.8 46.4 46.7 46.6
Lithuania 47.4 46.4 46.7 50.5 47.6 48.4
Malta 51.0 50.0 50.5 56.0 46.7 51.6
Poland 59.4 59.9 59.7 59.9 58.8 59.2
Slovakia 47.0 43.7 44.8 46.7 40.7 42.8
Slovenia 62.8 54.2 58.4 64.2 52.6 58.3
EU10 58.9 58.6 58.7 59.2 57.7 58.2
Sweden 76.0 73.6 74.8 75.9 72.9 74.5
Note: As those who immigrated to Sweden in December cannot have been employed 
in Sweden in November the same year the employment rates for the immigrants are 
underestimated. There are immigrants who have arrived from the areas of the present states 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as immigrants from the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those from others registered as 
immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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Table A.2.6 Distribution of People Born in One of the 
Accession States and in Sweden According to 
Industry in September 2004; Per cent
Country
Industry
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 All
Czech Republic 8 0 20 0 1 10 9 15 23 11 3 100
Czechoslovakia 2 0 17 1 2 16 14 13 22 8 5 100
Cyprus 4 0 12 0 3 17 12 17 16 17 4 100
Estonia 2 1 11 1 3 19 16 13 19 10 6 100
Hungary 2 0 19 1 3 18 14 12 19 8 4 100
Latvia 2 3 10 1 3 13 13 17 22 10 5 100
Lithuania 3 11 10 0 3 12 13 16 24 7 3 100
Malta 2 0 24 0 4 22 10 18 10 6 2 100
Poland 2 1 16 1 3 17 14 11 24 8 4 100
Slovakia 4 1 15 0 1 13 12 17 26 11 0 100
Slovenia 1 0 34 0 5 16 11 8 14 6 3 100
EU10 2 1 16 1 3 17 14 12 22 8 4 100
Sweden 1 2 17 1 6 19 13 11 16 7 6 100
Note: Industry classifi cation; 0 not classifi ed, 1 agriculture, forestry, fi shing, 2 manufacturing, 
mining, 3 public utilities, 4 construction, 5 trade, communication, 6 fi nancial services, 
business services, 7 education, 8 health care, 9 personal and cultural services, 10 public 
administration.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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Table A.2.7 Working Hours in September Among Those 
Aged 16-64 According to Country or Origin in 
September 2003 and 2004
2003 2004
Country Men Women All Men Women All
Czech Republic 142.7 118.2 130.8 158.1 117.4 136.9
Czechoslovakia 142.5 128.9 136.0 141.8 130.4 136.5
Cyprus 130.9 120.1 127.5 132.7 151.9 137.8
Estonia 144.6 127.9 135.1 134.5 126.3 129.5
Hungary 142.8 131.2 137.9 145.0 129.7 138.2
Latvia 150.5 128.4 136.4 139.3 123.4 128.7
Lithuania 158.0 130.5 140.0 145.7 126.1 131.4
Malta 128.1 121.8 125.9 169.3 123.0 157.7
Poland 143.6 129.5 135.1 142.7 130.5 135.4
Slovakia 162.4 133.2 146.7 149.5 120.7 137.1
Slovenia 141.8 122.3 133.9 132.9 124.4 129.9
EU10 143.4 129.5 135.7 142.6 129.8 135.5
Sweden 147.3 130.5 141.1 146.7 130.2 140.6
Note: Only those employed are included. There are immigrants who have arrived from the 
areas of the present states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as 
immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those 
from others registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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Table A.2.8 Monthly Wage Among Those Aged 16-64 
According to Country of Origin in September 
2003 and 2004; in Thousands SEK*
Country
2003 2004
Men Women All Men Women All
Czech Republic 27.2 20.5 23.9 24.4 21.5 22.9
Czechoslovakia 28.8 24.1 26.6 29.7 24.5 27.3
Cyprus 26.3 20.5 24.5 27.4 22.5 26.1
Estonia 27.1 20.7 23.5 26.1 20.8 22.9
Hungary 24.8 21.9 23.6 26.1 22.9 24.7
Latvia 26.5 21.0 23.1 25.2 21.0 22.4
Lithuania 26.2 18.4 21.1 27.9 19.5 21.7
Malta 21.3 18.6 20.3 23.7 18.2 22.3
Poland 24.5 21.3 22.6 24.9 21.8 23.0
Slovakia 22.9 19.9 21.5 24.3 22.4 23.5
Slovenia 23.7 20.1 22.3 23.8 21.0 22.9
EU10 25.2 21.5 23.1 25.7 22.0 23.6
Sweden 26.2 22.3 24.8 27.2 23.1 25.7
* For those working less than full-time the wage is recalculated to full-time wage
Note: Only those employed are included. There are immigrants who have arrived from the 
areas of the present states Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia who are registered as 
immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It has not been possible to separate those 
from others registered as immigrants from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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Table A.2.9 Distribution of People Born in One of the 
Accession States and in Sweden According to 
Education in 2004; Per cent
Country
Education
1 2 3 4 5 6 9 All
Czech Republic 2 4 28 5 36 5 18 100
Czechoslovakia 4 8 44 7 33 3 1 100
Cyprus 10 12 45 5 20 1 7 100
Estonia 5 9 31 6 37 3 9 100
Hungary 6 7 49 6 26 2 3 100
Latvia 2 8 22 6 42 5 15 100
Lithuania 1 5 16 5 45 7 21 100
Malta 8 15 40 4 21 1 11 100
Poland 4 9 44 6 30 2 6 100
Slovakia 4 7 22 3 31 6 27 100
Slovenia 12 11 49 4 17 1 5 100
EU10 4 8 42 6 31 2 6 100
Sweden 5 16 48 6 23 1 1 100
Note: Educational classifi cation; 1 primary school less than 9 years, 2 primary school 9(10) 
years, 3 secondary school, 4 higher education less than two years, 5 higher education two 
years or more, 6 post-graduate education, 9 missing information.
Source: Statistics Sweden
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Table A.2.10 Number of Applications for Social Assistance 
Granted Foreign Citizens Aged 16 and Older 
According to Country of Citizenship and Country 
of Origin in 2003 and 2004
Country of citizenship Country of origin
Country 2003 2004 2003 2004
Cyprus 8 8 23 24
Czech Republic 35 31 38 36
Estonia 125 124 230 218
Hungary 323 328 680 698
Latvia 55 59 102 95
Lithuania 79 91 83 96
Malta 2 4 3 7
Poland 1,753 1,702 3,021 3,020
Slovenia 28 26 26 24
Slovakia 96 112 66 79
Total 2,504 2,485 4,272 4,297
Source: Socialstyrelsen (The National Board of Health and Welfare)
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Table A.2.11 Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration, 
Ireland, 1987-2005, Thousands
Year Immigration Emigration Net Migration
1987 17.2 40.2 -23.0
1988 19.2 61.1 -41.9
1989 26.7 70.6 -43.9
1990 33.3 56.3 -22.9
1991 33.3 35.3 -2.0
1992 40.7 33.4 7.4
1993 34.7 35.1 -0.4
1994 30.1 34.8 -4.7
1995 31.2 33.1 -1.9
1996 39.2 31.2 8.0
1997 44.5 20.3 19.2
1998 46.0 28.6 17.4
1999 48.9 31.5 17.3
2000 52.6 26.6 26.0
2001 59.0 26.2 32.8
2002 66.9 25.6 35.0
2003 50.5 20.7 29.8
2004 50.1 18.5 31.6
2005 70.0 16.6 53.4
Note: These fi gures are derived from the CSO series of Annual Labour Force Surveys over 
the period from 1987 to 1996 and the QNHS series from 1997 onwards
Source: CSO Annual Population and Migration Estimates (various releases).
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Table A.2.12 Immigration Flows from the Accession States 
and Gross Immigration from the Rest of the 
World Including the Accession States as a 
Percentage of Total Immigration, 1987-2005, 
Thousands
Year Rest of World EU10
Per cent of total 
immigration to Ireland Total immigration
1987 1.5 - 8.8 17.2
1988 1.6 - 8.1 19.2
1989 2.2 - 8.2 26.7
1990 3.3 - 9.9 33.3
1991 2.1 - 6.2 33.3
1992 3.0 - 7.3 40.7
1993 2.6 - 7.5 34.7
1994 1.7 - 5.6 30.1
1995 3.1 - 9.9 31.2
1996 4.2 - 10.7 39.2
1997 5.5 - 12.4 44.4
1998 4.7 - 10.2 46.0
1999 4.5 - 9.2 48.8
2000 8.6 - 16.4 52.5
2001 13.6 - 23.0 59.1
2002 21.7 - 32.4 66.9
2003 17.7 - 35.0 50.6
2004 14.9 - 29.7 50.1
2005 35.4* 26.4 50.6 70.0
* Including EU10
Source: CSO Population and Migration Estimates (various editions).
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Table A.2.13 Number of Accession State 
Nationals in Employment Before 
and After Accession, Thousands
Non-EU including EU10 EU10
Q2 2003 48.6 -
Q2 2004 51.3 -
Q2 2005 91.9 47.3
Q4 2005 108.8 61.6
Source: CSO Special tabulation of Quarterly National Household Surveys
Table A.2.14 Estimated Number of Accession State Nationals 
Aged 15 Years and Over in Employment (ILO) 
in Ireland, Classifi ed by ILO Status, Q3 2004 to 
Q4 2005
Q3 2004 Q4 2004 Q1 2005 Q2 2005 Q3 2005 Q4 2005
Thousands
In Employment 19.5 28.1 34.9 47.3 53.2 61.6
Unemployed 1.0 1.5 1.8 3.2 3.4 3.6
In Labour Force 20.5 29.6 36.8 50.4 56.6 65.2
Not Economically Active 4.1 4.7 5.2 5.2 5.8 7.4
Per cent
In Employment 79.3 81.9 83.1 84.2 85.4 84.7
Unemployed 4.1 4.4 4.3 4.9 5.5 5.0
In Labour Force 83.3 86.3 87.6 89.2 90.9 89.7
Not Economically Active 16.7 13.7 12.4 10.8 9.3 10.2
Employment Growth and Participation Rates, Per cent
Employment Growth - 44.1 24.2 35.5 12.5 15.8
Participation Rates 83.3 86.3 87.4 90.8 90.9 89.7
Source: Quarterly National Household Surveys
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Table A.2.15  Employment of Accession State Nationals by 
NACE Sector, Q4 2004 and Q4 2005
NACE Sector Q4 2005 Q4 2005
Agriculture, forestry and fi shing 1.5 2.2
Other production industries 6.4 15.9
Construction 6.0 15.2
Wholesale and retail trade 4.0 8.0
Hotels and Restaurants 5.7 8.6
Transport, storage and communication 0.8 1.9
Financial and business services 1.7 4.5
Public administration and defence 0.0 0.0
Education 0.0 0.0
Health 0.7 1.3
Other Services 1.1 3.6
Total 28.1 61.6
Source: CSO Quarterly National Houshold Survey Q4 2005
Table A.2.16  Employment of Accession State Nationals 
by NACE Sector as a Proportion of the Total 
Workforce in Ireland, Q4 2004 and Q4 2005
NACE Sector Q4 2004 Q 4 2005
Agriculture, forestry and fi shing 1.3 1.9
Other production industries 2.1 5.5
Construction 2.6 6.0
Wholesale and retail trade 1.5 2.8
Hotels and Restaurants 5.1 7.4
Transport, storage and communication 0.7 1.6
Financial and business services 0.7 1.7
Public administration and defence 0.0 0.0
Education 0.0 0.0
Health 0.4 0.7
Other Services 0.9 2.9
Total 1.5 3.1
Source: CSO Quarterly National Houshold Survey Q4 2005
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Figure A.2.17 Employment in Ireland by NACE sector, Q4 
2004 and Q4 2005
NACE Sector Q4 2004 Q4 2005 Change
Agriculture, forestry and fi shing 112.5 115.3 2.8
Other production industries 301.1 288.2 -12.9
Construction 227.4 253.2 25.8
Wholesale and retail trade 265.4 285.0 19.6
Hotels and Restaurants 112.6 115.5 2.9
Transport, storage and communication 115.7 118.3 2.6
Financial and business services 247.7 263.0 15.3
Public administration and defence 94.4 100.7 6.3
Education 118.5 127.9 9.4
Health 182.5 191.5 9.0
Other Services 116.3 122.1 5.8
Total 1894.1 1980.6 86.5
Source: CSO Quarterly National Houshold Survey Q4 2005
Table A.2.18 Number of Work Permits Issued to Accession 
State Nationals, 2001-2004*
Year Permits Issued to EU10 Nationals Total Permits Issued
2001 13,330 36,446
2002 13,752 40,321
2003 16,606 47,551
2004 5,290 13,041
* 2004 data refers to permits issued from 1st of January to 31st of April
Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
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Table A.2.19 Personal Public Service Numbers Issued to 
Accession State Nationals, 2001-2005
Nationality 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cyprus 12 8 6 27 23
Czech Republic 1,428 1,144 831 3,298 4,505
Estonia 858 463 546 1,788 2,011
Hungary 511 259 185 1,839 3,086
Latvia 3,023 1,538 1,230 6,266 9,328
Lithuania 2,735 2,782 2,379 12,817 18,717
Malta 237 209 191 205 124
Poland 2,259 2,649 3,828 27,295 64,731
Slovakia 328 252 248 5,187 9,258
Slovenia 1 2 7 64 76
Total 11,392 9,306 9,451 58,786 111,859
Source: Department of Social and Family Affairs
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Table A.2.20 Personal Public Service Numbers Issued to 
Nationals of Accession States, May 2004 to 
February 2006
Month Poland Baltic States
Czech Republic 
and Slovakia
Hungary, 
Slovenia, Malta 
and Cyprus
20
04
May 3,510 3,192 1,054 312
June 3,045 2,383 1,217 229
July 4,853 2,541 1,408 261
August 2,786 2,011 676 177
September 2,972 2,422 881 260
October 4,195 2,954 1,303 365
November 2,716 2,284 659 249
December 1,145 1,029 376 117
20
05
January 3,575 2,677 995 260
February 3,851 2,678 1,016 234
March 3,150 2,242 826 226
April 5,175 3,117 1,226 284
May 4,485 2,320 1,004 230
June 6,811 3,053 1,536 199
July 9,511 2,667 1,595 316
August 5,915 2,523 1,050 286
September 6,017 2,787 1,394 361
October 7,212 2,667 1,439 399
November 6,428 2,363 1,261 293
December 2,968 1,171 525 147
20
06 January 5,595 2,033 1,045 254
February 7,262 2,441 1,185 312
Total 103,177 53,555 23,671 5,771
Source: Department of Social and Family Affairs
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Table A.2.21 Percentage of Personal Public Service 
Numbers Issued to Accession State Citizens, by 
Nationality, 2000-2005
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cyprus 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 12.5 12.3 8.8 5.6 4.0
Estonia 7.5 5.0 5.8 3.0 1.8
Hungary 4.5 2.8 2.0 3.1 2.8
Latvia 26.5 16.5 13.0 10.7 8.3
Lithuania 24.0 29.9 25.2 21.8 16.7
Malta 2.1 2.2 2.0 0.3 0.1
Poland 19.8 28.5 40.5 46.4 57.9
Slovakia 2.9 2.7 2.6 8.8 8.3
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Source: Department of Social and Family Affairs
Table A.2.22 Average Hourly Earnings Growth by Sector, 
Average of Five Quarters Pre and Post 
Accession
Growth Rate March 03 to 
May 04
Growth Rate May 04 to 
Sept. 04
Education 10.5 9.2
Other production industries 8.8 3.6
Construction 6.7 8.2
Transport, storage and communication 9.1 2.4
Wholesale and retail trade 3.9 5.4
Hotels and Restaurants 8.9 6.9
Buiness and Financial Services 5.7 5.1
Other  Services 8.5 2.5
Distribution 10.9 3.5
Public administration and defence 11.4 7.2
Economy 8.8 5.7
Source: ESRI earnings series created from CSO earnings publication
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SVENSK SAMMANFATTNING
I takt med att 2004 års utvidgning av Europeiska unionen (EU) närmade
sig ökade också farhågorna i de gamla EU-medlemsstaterna för vilka
effekter utvidgningen skulle få på arbetsmarknaderna och på de framtida
migrationsströmmarna. Storleken på utvidgningen, tillsammans med högre
arbetslöshet och lägre inkomster i anslutningsländerna (EU10) – särskilt i
de Central och Östeuropeiska medlemsstaterna – skapade oro för mass-
invandring och ”social turism”. När utvidgningen väl var ett faktum var det
endast Irland, Storbritannien och Sverige som öppnade sina arbetsmark-
nader för fri arbetskraftsrörlighet från de nya medlemsstaterna. Denna rap-
port försöker ge ett så uttömmande svar som möjligt på frågan om vad
som har hänt sedan 1 maj 2004 utifrån tillgängliga data i två av dessa län-
der; Irland och Sverige.1
Förutvidgningsdebatterna
Även om Irland, Storbritannien och Sverige öppnade upp sina arbetsmark-
nader för arbetare från anslutningsstaterna diskuterade framstående aktörer
även i dessa länder om det inte fanns anledning att införa någon form av
restriktioner. Sveriges statsminister Göran Persson startade denna diskus-
sion på allvar när han i november 2003 för första gången uttryckte oro för
att det svenska socialförsäkringssystemet skulle missbrukas av människor
från de nya EU-länderna. I den debatt som följde uttrycktes också farhågor
för lönekonkurrens och massinvandring till följd av att Sverige var ett av få
länder som hade valt att tillåta fri arbetskraftsinvandring. Samtidigt argu-
menterade andra för att Sverige var på väg att begå löftesbrott med tanke
på sin ursprungliga position. Vidare menade många debattörer att faran för
”social turism” var så gott som obefintlig mot bakgrund av att de männis-
kor som väljer att emigrera oftast är unga, välutbildade och ogifta. Detta
talade i sin tur för att de ekonomiska vinsterna skulle vara större än förlus-
terna.
Den svenska regeringens tillkännagivande att man hade för avsikt att före-
slå så kallade övergångsregler i syfte att begränsa invandringen fick effek-
ter i Irland och Storbritannien. Det brittiska konservativa partiet, Tory, och
den brittiska tabloidpressen satte press på Labour-regeringen, som i februa-
ri 2004 annonserade åtgärder i syfte att sätta stopp för ”social turism” från
EU10. Vidare infördes ett registreringssystem (Worker Registration Sche-
me) enligt vilket arbetare från EU10 tvingas registrera sig inom en månad
1 Effekterna på den brittiska arbetsmarknaden har analyserats detaljerat i Gilpin et al. (2005).
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efter att de har hittat arbete i Storbritannien. Syftet med systemet är att
övervaka invandringen från de nya medlemsstaterna.
Den starka irländska ekonomin och det stora antalet vakanser har inneburit
att Irland till stor del har tvingats rekrytera utländsk arbetskraft. Den ir-
ländska debatten fokuserade därför i hög grad på att skydda det irländska
välfärdssystemet, i synnerhet efter den brittiska omsvängningen. I slutet av
februari 2004 introducerade den irländska regeringen ett bosättningskrav
(Habital Residence Condition), enligt vilket utländska medborgare var
tvungna att bo i den så kallade Common Travel Area (Irland, Kanalöarna,
Isle of Man och Storbritannien och Nordirland) i åtminstone två år innan
de tilläts tillträde till bidragssystemet.
Fyra olika typer av system för övergångsregler infördes 2004 i EU-15. Det
första systemet (Belgien, Finland, Frankrike, Grekland, Tyskland och Öster-
rike) gav samma rättigheter till medborgare från EU10 som för medborgare
utanför EES-området. Det andra systemet (Danmark, Italien, Nederländerna
och Portugal) var detsamma som det första med undantag för att kvoter be-
stämde hur många arbetare från EU10 som släpptes in. Det tredje systemet
(Irland och Storbritannien) tillåter obegränsat antal arbetare från de nya
medlemsstaterna men begränsar tillgången till välfärdssystemet. Det fjärde
systemet (Sverige) innebär att EU-lagstiftningen tillämpas fullt ut.
Ekonomiska effekter av invandring
De stora inkomstskillnaderna och den höga arbetslösheten i EU10 tillsam-
mans med fri rörlighet för arbetskraft implicerar att arbetskraften framför
allt kommer att flytta från nya till gamla medlemsstater. Stora inkomstskill-
nader är dock inte ett tillräckligt villkor för att migration ska komma till
stånd. Arbetslösheten och antalet vakanser i mottagarlandet är viktiga fak-
torer och arbetsmarknaders relativa styrka avgör i hög grad till vilka länder
– Irland, Storbritannien eller Sverige – arbetskraften väljer att flytta. Andra
faktorer som är viktiga för emigrantens val av land är den geografiska när-
heten och det talade språket i mottagarlandet. Studier har visat att engelsk-
språkiga länder föredras av invandrare med hög utbildning.
Nettoeffekterna av invandring på den offentliga sektorn beror av storleken
på invandringen, sammansättningen av de nya invandrarna samt hur ekono-
min preseterar. Termen ”social turism” implicerar att människor väljer att
flytta till ett annat land för att där finns ett generöst och väl utbyggt väl-
färdssystem. Empiriska studier har dock inte visat på något entydigt stöd
för denna hypotes.
Generellt sett leder invandring till att arbetsutbudet ökar, vilket i sin tur
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implicerar sjunkande löner. Ett större arbetsutbud kan dock också leda till
fler investeringar, vilka motverkar sjunkande löner. Vidare är arbete inte en
homogen produktionsfaktor; den invandrade arbetskraften kan verka som
komplement snarare än substitut till den inhemska arbetskraften, vilket i sin
tur implicerar att invandringen leder till högre löner för inhemska arbetare.
Det är därför inte möjligt att bestämma invandringens effekt på löner utan
empiriska studier. De flesta dylika studier indikerar att effekterna är små.
Oro har också funnits för undanträngningseffekter. Detta argument baseras
på en idé om att antalet arbetstillfällen i en ekonomi är fast och förbe-
stämt, något som inte är sant. Arbetslösheten beror framför allt av den ma-
kroekonomiska utvecklingen och ekonomisk politik. Tillgängliga empiriska
studier indikerar att effekterna av invandring på arbetslösheten är små.
Sverige efter utvidgningen
Arbetskraftsinvandring var den dominerande formen av invandring till Sve-
rige under efterkrigstiden och fram till lågkonjunkturen i början av 70-ta-
let, då arbetskraftsinvandringen mer eller mindre stoppades från länder
utanför den gemensamma nordiska arbetsmarknaden. Flödet har mestadels
gått från länder med lägre inkomst- och lönenivåer än i Sverige. Variatio-
nerna över tiden har varit stora och mycket känsliga för hur arbetsmarkna-
den har presterat. Immigrationen från EU10 kommer sannolikt att domine-
ras av arbetskraftsinvandring och vi kan därför förvänta oss stora fluktua-
tioner beroende på den svenska arbetsmarknadssituationen.
Invandringen från EU10 ökade kraftigt i relativa termer 2004 och 2005
jämfört med 2003. I absoluta tal är invandringen dock liten och den utgör
en mycket liten del av den totala invandringen till Sverige. År 2003 in-
vandrade 2381 personer från EU10, medan motsvarande siffror för 2004
och 2005 var 4232 respektive 5559. Emigrationen från Sverige till EU10
ökade också, men inte alls i samma omfattning som invandringen. Män-
nens andel av den totala invandringen ökade efter anslutningen. Mer än
hälften av invandrarna kom från Polen men en stor andel av invandrarna
kom också från de baltiska staterna, i synnerhet Estland och Litauen.
Det finns åtminstone tre skäl till att invandringen har varit så obetydlig
från EU10. För det första har antalet vakanser varit lågt. För det andra
visade undersökningar före utvidgningen av få hade Sverige som förstaval.
För det tredje har flödet från EU10 gått till Irland och Storbritannien, tack
vare bättre arbetsmarknader och av språkskäl.
Statistiken över antalet uppehållstillstånd enligt EES-avtalet, vilken ger in-
formation om den kortsiktiga immigrationen, ökade både 2004 och 2005.
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Ökningen är störst i kategorierna egenföretagare och konsulter, men antalet
uppehållstillstånd som beviljades till studenter och anhöriga till människor
som redan bor i Sverige ökade också. Totalt beviljades 6317 uppehållstill-
stånd till medborgare från EU10 2003, medan motsvarande siffra 2004 och
2005 var 8487 respektive 9012.
Den svenska arbetsmarknadsstatistiken har en fördröjning, vilket gör det
omöjligt att säga något om de som har kommit 2005 och 2006, men sys-
selsättningen både 2003 och 2004 för medborgare från de nya EU-länderna
var lägre än för inhemska medborgare. Bland sysselsatta medborgare från
EU10 är också antalet arbetade timmar mindre och månadslönen lägre,
medan utbildningsnivån däremot är högre. Skillnader är också synliga i ar-
betskraftens fördelning över sektorer; medborgare från EU10 är överrepre-
senterade i sjukvårdssektorn, en sektor som karaktäriserats av hög efterfrå-
gan på arbetskraft, medan den inhemska arbetskraften istället är överrepre-
senterad i byggnadsbranschen och i offentlig förvaltning.
Ekonometriska skattningar indikerar en negativ lönepremie på ungefär tio
procent för medborgare från EU10, med en något positivare bild för in-
vandrade kvinnor än för invandrade män. Ju tidigare en invandrare har an-
länt i landet, desto mindre är skillnaden till den inhemska arbetskraften.
För dem som anlände före 1970 är skillnaden mindre än 3 procent och för
dem som anlände 2003-2004 är skillnaden 20 procent.
När det gäller oron för “social turism” synes den ha varit obefogad. Anta-
let ansökningar om socialbidrag var mer eller mindre konstant 2004 jäm-
fört med 2003, det vill säga innan utvidgningen var ett faktum. Vidare gick
endast en (1) procent av utbetalat stöd till familjer i de nya medlemssta-
terna (ca €0.01 million).
Irland efter utvidgningen
Liksom i Sverige har migrationsflödet till och från Irland varit mycket
känsligt för det ekonomiska läget, både i Irland och i sändar/mottagarlan-
det. Under perioden 1995 till 2000 upplevde den irländska ekonomin ett
rejält uppsving, vilket ledde till att migrationsflödena reverserades från att
ha varit negativa under 80-talet. Irland fick uppleva positiv nettomigration
och i April 2005 nådde den utlandsfödda delen av befolkningen 6.3 pro-
cent av den totala irländska befolkningen. Motsvarande siffra 1996 var 3.2
procent. Även om uppsvinget nådde sin kulmen vid millennieskiftet var
den irländska ekonomin fortfarande stark vid tidpunkten för utvidgningen,
med en BNP-tillväxt på 4.5 procent, högst i EU, och en arbetslöshet på 4.4
procent, lägst i EU.
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Utvidgningen verkar inte heller ha verkat för att slå av takten på den ir-
ländska ekonomin. Däremot har invandringen, till skillnad från i Sverige,
varit mycket högre än vad som förväntades före utvidgningen. Detta för-
klaras framför allt av den irländska ekonomins styrka med en hög efterfrå-
gan på arbetskraft, men det kan möjligtvis också till viss del förklaras av
en viss omdirigeringseffekt från de EU-länder som valde att införa över-
gångsregler. Under det fjärde kvartalet 2005 beräknas att ca 73,000 med-
borgare från EU10 bodde i Irland.
Arbetskraftsdeltagandet för medborgare från EU10 är 90 procent, att jämfö-
ra med 62 procent för irländska medborgare. Ökningen av antalet medbor-
gare från EU10 i sysselsättning mer än tredubblades mellan det tredje kvar-
talet 2004 (19,500) och det fjärde kvartalet 2005 (61,600). Medborgare från
de nya EU-länderna har därmed svarat för ungefär hälften av de arbeten
som har skapats i Irland sedan utvidgningen. Samtidigt har arbetslösheten
inom denna grupp varit mycket låg, i genomsnitt 2.4 procent, att jämföras
med 4.4 procent för irländska medborgare. Majoriteten av arbetare från
EU10 återfinns i tillverknings- och byggnadsbranscherna, vilka tillsammans
sysselsätter hälften av arbetskraften från EU10. Hotell- och restaurang-
branschen svarar för största andelen i förhållande till den inhemska arbets-
kraften, med 7.4 procent av den totala arbetskraften i den sektorn.
De irländska Public Personal Service Numbers (PPSNs), individuella per-
sonbevis som krävs för att ta anställning och för att få tillgång till olika bi-
drag i Irland, erbjuder detaljerad information om den kortsiktiga invandring-
en från de nya EU-länderna. Antalet PPSNs till medborgare från EU10 har
ökat dramatiskt sedan millennieskiftet i allmänhet och sedan utvidgningen i
synnerhet. År 2004 utgavs 59,000 PPSNs (54,000 efter 1 maj) och 2005
nästan fördubblades antalet till 112,000. Mellan maj 2004 och februari
2006 har 186,000 PPSNs allokerats till medborgare från EU10. Av dessa
gick fler än hälften till polska medborgare. Samtidigt var färre än 1,000
medborgare från anslutningsländerna registrerade som arbetslöshetsbidrags-
tagare i mars 2006, vilket talar emot hypotesen om ”social turism” som en
viktig faktor för invandringen till Irland från de nya medlemsstaterna. 
Även om det inte har varit möjligt att skilja mellan irländska medborgare
och medborgare från anslutningsländerna med avseende på tillväxttakten i
inkomster, är det intressant att notera att takten har avtagit efter utvid-
gningen i åtta av de tio sektor för vilka data är tillgängliga. Detta är, som
noterades ovan, i linje med vad ekonomisk teori förutspår. Det är samtidigt
viktigt att påpeka att den avtagande tillväxttakten i inkomster ryms väl i
historiska erfarenheter av utvidgningar och kan möjligen också förklaras
av faktorer som inte är relaterade till en ökad invandring.
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I den irländska kontexten har det också förekommit en oro för att inhemsk
arbetskraft har trängts undan av invandrad arbetskraft, genom att den se-
nare gruppen har betalats lägre löner än de kollektivt överenskomna löner-
na. Detta motsägs dock av att den förväntade minskningen av antalet va-
kanser och ökningen i arbetslösheten har lyst med sin frånvaro. I maj 2004
rapporterade 10.6 av alla företag vakanser, en siffra som i stort sett var
oförändrad i maj 2005. I februari 2006 rapporterade 16.7 procent av före-
tagen vakanser. Det finns heller inga bevis för undanträngning att finna i
tillgängliga arbetslöshetsdata. Däremot kan undanträngning bli ett problem
om inga åtgärder vidtas, som till exempel att stärka kollektivavtalen och
erbjuda information om arbetares rättigheter i Irland.
Slutsatser
Utvidgningen av den Europeiska unionen 1 maj 2004 ledde till ökad immi-
gration från EU10 till Irland och Sverige. Två år är en mycket kort period
för att undersöka vilka effekter detta har haft på arbetsmarknaderna i de
två länderna och dataproblem gör att perioden i många fall är ännu kor-
tare. Vi anser dock att den information som finns i denna rapport ger ett
värdefullt bidrag till kunskapen om vad som händer när hindren mot fri ar-
betskraftsrörlighet tas bort.
I Sverige var migrationsflödena lägre än förväntat, medan de var mycket
högre än förväntat i Irland. Irlands ekonomi var mycket stark vid tidpunk-
ten för utvidgningen, med låg arbetslöshet och hög sysselsättningstillväxt.
Detta har gjort landet attraktivt för arbetare från de nya medlemsstaterna.
Arbetskraftsdeltagandet bland nyanlända medborgare från EU10 har varit
90 procent, att jämföras med 62 procent för irländska medborgare. Det
finns det stora inflödet till trots inga bevis för störningar på den irländska
arbetsmarknaden. I inget av länderna finns heller några tecken på ”social
turism”.
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